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MONITORING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Stephen Lee*

More than two-thirds of the unauthorized immigrant population—roughly 8
million out of 11.2 million—is in our nation’s workforce, and growing evidence
suggests that unauthorized workers are more likely than their authorized
counterparts to experience workplace-related violations. Although scholars have
begun shifting their focus to the agencies empowered to regulate immigrants in the
workplace, important questions remain unanswered. Why, for example, has the
Department of Labor, our nation’s top labor enforcement agency, struggled to
protect unauthorized workers against this exploitation despite the scope and
seriousness of the problem? And why has Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
our nation’s top immigration enforcement agency, resisted taking into account the
labor consequences of their actions? Our ignorance is becoming increasingly
indefensible given that agencies often have the final word within an immigration
universe characterized by legislative stasis. A closer look reveals a peculiar
dynamic: ICE has relatively little interest in regulating the relationship between
employers and unauthorized workers, while the DOL has a relatively high interest
but lacks the autonomy to effectively do so—a dynamic that tends to foster
interagency conflict, ultimately enabling the problem of labor exploitation to
persist. What is the way out? Borrowing the insights of administrative law
scholars, this Article argues that increasing the ability of the DOL to monitor
immigration enforcement decisions can help minimize the externalities that ICE
actions ordinarily force the DOL to absorb. This monitoring framework constrains
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the ex ante stage of decisionmaking, complements existing immigration
scholarship (which has tended to focus on ex post remedies like expanding the
ability of the DOL to issue temporary visas), and pushes back on ICE’s law
enforcement culture (which has traditionally resisted the incorporation of labor
norms). Moreover, the monitoring framework is able to track evolving problems of
coordination and to identify emerging vulnerabilities as the Executive’s
immigration enforcement authority continues to grow and outpace the
development of adequate constraints on the exercise of that authority.
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INTRODUCTION
More than two-thirds of the total unauthorized immigrant population—
roughly 8 million out of 11.2 million—is in our nation’s workforce,1 and growing
evidence suggests that unauthorized workers are more likely than their authorized

1.
See PEW RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION:
NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://
pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf. Although this class of noncitizens is often referred to
by a variety of names, I use the term “unauthorized” because it avoids the untoward
normative implications of the term “illegal” alien or immigrant and it better comports with
the relevant statutory provision than the term “undocumented.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)
(2006) (“[T]he term ‘unauthorized alien’ means, with respect to the employment of an alien
at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney
General.”).

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1974624
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974624

2011]

MONITORING IMMIGRATION

1091

counterparts to experience labor violations.2 Determining where immigration law
ends and where labor law begins can be difficult.3 Scholars have recently begun
grappling with questions related to the promises and the perils associated with the
agencies empowered to regulate immigrants in the workplace.4 This conversation
merits greater attention given that agencies increasingly have the final word within
an immigration system characterized by legislative stasis.5 A closer look at the
agencies populating this system reveals a contentious and negotiable set of
relationships. This is an area of regulation filled with turf battles, where some
agencies lose power6 and others are created to fill vacuums,7 and where agencies

2.
See CHIRAG MEHTA ET AL., UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., CTR. FOR URBAN ECON.
DEV., CHICAGO’S UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: AN ANALYSIS OF WAGES, WORKING
CONDITIONS,
AND
ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTIONS
27
(2002),
available
at
http://www.urbaneconomy.org/sites/default/files/undoc_wages_working_64.pdf.
3.
So persistent is this indeterminacy that even mere shifts in emphasis by
experts are deemed noteworthy. Prior to being appointed Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”) commissioner, Doris Meissner noted that in regard to the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), “When enacted, employer sanctions were
perceived as labor-related immigration law. In retrospect, it is increasingly clear that they
are, and should be treated as, immigration-related labor law.” Robert Bach & Doris
Meissner, Employment and Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions Four Years Later, in
THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND REFORM 281,
291 (Michael Fix ed., 1991).
4.
See, e.g., Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occupational Safety
and Health Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479 (2009); Leticia M. Saucedo,
Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated
Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303 (2010). For the most
part, scholars have focused on the role that private organizations can play in facilitating the
assertion of labor rights. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S.
CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 407 (1995); see also, e.g., JANELLE S. WONG, DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE: IMMIGRANTS
AND AMERICAN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS (2006); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Celia Viramontes,
Civic Spaces: Mexican Hometown Associations and Immigration Participation, 66 J. SOC.
ISSUES 155 (2010). But see Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards
Enforcement Through Partnerships and Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552,
560–62 (2010) (advocating for a model of labor enforcement where public agencies partner
with private organizations).
5.
See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint through Delegation: The Case of
Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1796–1803 (2010)
(describing the current immigration system as suffering from problems of “stasis”).
6.
After being lodged in the Department of Labor (“DOL”) for the first half of
the 20th century, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was transferred to the
Department of Justice in 1940. Reorganization Plan No. V, 5 Fed. Reg. 2223 (June 14,
1940).
7.
The INS was dissolved in 2002 and replaced by several new agencies within
the newly created Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
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wrangle for supremacy and hurl accusations of sabotage at one another.8 They
even impersonate one another from time to time.
Consider the following examples. A cheese manufacturer in Tennessee
knowingly hired several unauthorized migrant workers and then refused to pay
them. The workers staged a protest, were detained by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”), and eventually obtained U visas9 to assist in the prosecution
of the employer. Meanwhile, the U.S. Attorney filed charges against those same
workers for using fraudulent social security numbers to obtain employment.10 One
hand takes what the other gives. In another case, unauthorized workers in
Goldsboro, North Carolina gathered for what appeared to be a mandatory safety
training conducted by the Occupation Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”). Upon arrival, the workers were detained by ICE officials who had
posted notices in a strategy of bait-and-switch, causing OSHA officials—who had
no knowledge of the meeting—to immediately set out on a campaign to repair
damaged relationships with the surrounding unauthorized community.11 In still
other cases, immigration officials have responded to employer “tips” and “leads”
even where it is abundantly clear that the employer is trying to report (and thus
deport) the very unauthorized workers it knowingly hired in the first place.12 In
these cases and others, immigration enforcement agency officials could have
considered the labor consequences of their decisions but chose not to do so, while
labor agency officials would have preferred to coordinate enforcement efforts but
were powerless to force any such conversation.13
Against this backdrop, two questions concerning agency coordination
emerge as central to solving the puzzle of workplace enforcement. First, why has
the Department of Labor, our nation’s top labor enforcement agency, struggled to
protect unauthorized workers against exploitative practices despite the scope and
seriousness of the problem? And second, why has ICE, our nation’s top
immigration enforcement agency, resisted taking into account the labor

8.
See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 113–14 (1992).
9.
These are temporary visas, created under the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act, which provide to the victims of certain crimes in exchange for help
prosecuting the perpetrator. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
10.
See Monica Mercer, Cases Highlight Competing Interests in Immigration
Policy, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.timesfreepress.com/
news/2010/mar/09/cases-highlight-competing-interests-in/.
11.
See Steven Greenhouse, An Immigration Sting Puts Two Federal Agencies at
Odds, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2005, at A11 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Immigration Sting];
Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Officials Defend Ploys to Catch Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2006, at A8 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Officials Defend Ploys].
12.
See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 1103, 1120–23 (2009).
13.
See REBECCA SMITH ET AL., ICED OUT: HOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
HAS INTERFERED WITH WORKERS’ RIGHTS 15–28 (2009), available at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/75a43e6ae48f67216a_w2m6bp1ak.pdf.
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consequences of its actions?14 The answers to these questions can be traced to a
peculiar dynamic: ICE, whose primary mission is to target noncitizens for
detention and deportation, has relatively little interest in regulating the employer–
unauthorized worker relationship, while the DOL has a relatively high interest but
lacks the autonomy to effectively do so. Although ICE and the DOL are both
charged with the duty of regulating employers for hiring unauthorized workers,
their relationship has largely been an asymmetric one. ICE has been able to
effectively dictate the terms of our nation’s workplace enforcement strategy and
has largely been resistant or indifferent to the labor consequences of its decisions.
Taken together, these dynamics, especially when combined with other
exacerbating factors,15 tend to disrupt agency coordination and enable labor
exploitation to persist.
Moreover, traditional administrative law fixes do not offer easy or
obvious solutions to the problem of asymmetric enforcement authority in the
workplace. For example, as administrative law scholars well know, the President is
free to use his oversight and monitoring powers to coordinate the enforcement
priorities of the various agencies within the executive branch of the federal
government. And President Obama has, more than his predecessors, demonstrated
a willingness to use this power to bring immigration enforcement goals in line with
labor enforcement goals. This oversight power, combined with the election of a
President sympathetic to the interests of unauthorized workers and the appointment
of a Secretary of Labor who shares those sympathies, should spell the end of the
Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) triumph over the DOL and the
displacement of labor interests in the workplace. Yet, there are plenty of signs that
DHS officials, who are steeped in a work culture geared toward law-and-order
methods of regulation, have resisted the President’s entreaty to consider the labor
consequences of their enforcement decisions. Change at the top offers no
guarantee that change will easily follow at the bottom, at least in the divided world
of workplace regulation.
Another administrative law fix with intuitive appeal is agency splitting—
the breaking apart of an agency and reallocation of authority. If the problem is that
DHS tends to target unauthorized workers to the exclusion of the employers who
hire and exploit these workers, then agency-splitting advocates would suggest
14.
Similar questions concerning mission orientation, enforcement discretion,
and unauthorized migration could be posed of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. See, e.g.,
Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971); Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
“Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167 (2003). Still, the bulk of this
Article focuses on the enforcement constraints imposed on ICE in order to minimize
distractions from the primary purpose of this Article, which is to develop the monitoring
framework in the context of workplace enforcement. Questions concerning how labor
agencies interact with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and the consequences that flow from such
interactions, are better left to be answered as a part of my larger project examining the
intersection of labor, immigration, and criminal law. See infra Part IV.
15.
In prior work, I address some of the consequences of allowing employers to
screen their workers for immigration status. See Lee, supra note 12. This Article moves up
the lens of analysis to focus on the agencies themselves.
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transferring the latter power to labor agencies like the DOL, an agency with a
mission orientation that might better accommodate an enforcement mandate
involving employers. But past administrative experiments that even suggested that
the DOL was empowered to directly regulate employers for immigration violations
proved costly; often, labor officials ended up alienating unauthorized workers, the
very cross-section of workers interagency collaboration should protect.16
What is the solution? In this Article, I argue that one potential solution to
the persistent problem of asymmetric workplace regulation is interagency
monitoring—empowering labor agencies, like the DOL, to monitor DHS to ensure
that immigration officials account for the labor consequences of their enforcement
decisions. Although immigration scholars are still struggling to understand the
dynamics affecting agency interactions, this Article borrows insights developed by
administrative law and other public law scholars who have been exploring these
dynamics for years. In doing so, I explain that for most of its history, ICE has
resisted targeting employers because doing so has rarely meshed well with its
primary mission of detaining and removing noncitizens. Interagency monitoring
provides an opportunity to achieve the kind of balancing act that immigration
enforcement demands: It allows the DOL to indirectly inject workers’ interests
into the workplace enforcement process without incurring the costs that flow from
a direct intervention.
Examining workplace enforcement through the lens of interagency
monitoring offers at least three benefits to existing immigration scholarship. First,
it provides a vocabulary and framework to help refine our understandings of why
prior attempts by the Executive to coordinate agency actions have failed.17
Developing a clearer picture of these coordination challenges is all the more
important given that statutory reform remains elusive in this political environment.
Second, it supplements the efforts made by a small but growing number of
immigration scholars who have argued in favor of expanding the role of labor
agencies in workplace enforcement. Although the details differ, the proposals
offered by these scholars all share one common feature: expanding the ability of
labor agencies to issue temporary visas to victims of workplace crimes.18 When
ICE investigates a workplace and arrests unauthorized workers, some or all of
these workers may be entitled to temporarily (and perhaps permanently) adjust
their status despite their having engaged in unauthorized work. These visas
intervene at the ex post stage and act as a check against screening errors.
Interagency monitoring offers an alternative vision that focuses on constraining
DHS decisions at the ex ante stage with the hope that doing so will force ICE
officials to meaningfully coordinate their enforcement efforts from the beginning
and not later down the line as an afterthought. Third and finally, interagency
monitoring offers an institutional design account of an area of law that has been

16.
See infra Part I.C.2.
17.
See infra Part III.B.
18.
See Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A
Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
247, 308; Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant
Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 935–44 (2008).
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scrutinized primarily for its substantive shortcomings.19 Holding the substance of
the formal law as a constant, this Article examines the pressures, incentives, and
constraints affecting agency interactions and how these interactions in turn change
the scope of relief available under labor law.
As this Article explains, the core of the problem is that ICE operates
within an enforcement vacuum. For much of its history, ICE has been largely
insulated against meaningful oversight as to its workplace enforcement decisions,
enabling its officers to rely on tips, leads, and other information without
considering whether an investigation enables a bad-actor employer to escape
liability for labor violations or chills the reporting of labor violations by
unauthorized workers. An ex ante solution, therefore, slows the process of moving
from the receipt of information to implementing a full-blown investigation. For
overzealous ICE officials, interagency monitoring induces a stop-and-think effect
by requiring ICE officials to coordinate with the DOL officials who, by virtue of
their worker-oriented mission, are focused on precisely those dynamics ICE
officials are likely to resist or ignore. And for well-intentioned ICE officials who
have no desire to allow immigration law to displace labor law, monitoring also
offers the benefit of the DOL’s expertise, which can counteract the blind spots that
develop within ICE’s field of vision.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the ex ante solution should displace
the ex post visa solution. The two strategies apply pressure at different stages of
enforcement, and I see them as complementary. But the monitoring solution does
offer something that the other model does not: it helps minimize the “downstream”
effects of enforcement decisions.20 In other words, ICE’s unconstrained
enforcement power has generated externalities that impact the DOL, chill the
reporting of labor violations, and ultimately frustrate the DOL’s ability to identify
exploitative employers.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out to show that (1) in theory,
ICE and the DOL are empowered to jointly regulate the workplace on relatively
equal terms; but (2) in practice, workplace enforcement powers have been
distributed asymmetrically between immigration and labor agencies, mostly
because of the different informational challenges facing each agency; (3) a part of
this pathology can be traced to the lack of effective oversight; and (4) traditional
administrative law solutions, like executive oversight or agency splitting, do not
present viable options. Taken together, these observations lead to the conclusion
that the DOL and other labor agencies face near-insurmountable obstacles in
detecting employers who exploit unauthorized workers, and this detection problem
can be traced to ICE’s ability to make enforcement decisions with little DOL input.
Of course, problems of interagency coordination are not new. In Part II, I
show that similar regulatory problems in other contexts have been addressed
through monitoring arrangements, where one agency monitors the decisions made
by the lead agency. Specifically, this body of literature grapples with the problem
19.
See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1746–62 (2010).
20.
See infra Part III.D.
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of an agency shirking enforcement goals because those goals present a mismatch
with its mission orientation.21 In this scenario, officials in the lead agency resist,
ignore, or fail to fully appreciate their secondary obligations for reasons of work
culture or expertise (or both). The monitoring agency, therefore, seeks to remind
the lead agency—either through gentle nudging or through the coercion of law—
that they must fulfill enforcement obligations, even secondary ones.
Part III then examines the case of workplace enforcement through the
lens of interagency monitoring. Here, I explain that the goal of regulating
employers has presented a mismatch given ICE’s primary mission orientation of
identifying and removing noncitizens, an orientation that has proven to be fairly
resistant to labor norms and goals. Over the course of the last quarter century,
labor and immigration officials have made some efforts to coordinate their
enforcement strategies. This Part also explains why worksite enforcement
strategies continued to displace labor law despite these coordination efforts. As I
explain, whether and to what extent immigration officials considered the labor
consequences of their enforcement decisions was a matter that was largely left to
self-regulation. Labor officials lacked the ability to monitor the process by which
immigration officials moved from targeting a workplace to investigating it. This is
precisely the sort of problem that interagency monitoring can help solve. By
allowing the DOL to exercise oversight at the enforcement stage, immigration
officials are forced to consider the secondary and complementary interests bound
up in labor enforcement. I also identify and allay some concerns about expanding
the DOL’s role at the ex ante enforcement stage.
In addition to easing longstanding interagency conflicts, Part IV explains
that the monitoring framework provides another benefit: It helps identify emerging
vulnerabilities in workplace enforcement. The tensions that have characterized
relationships between immigration and labor agencies will inevitably migrate as
the number of agencies involved in workplace enforcement increases. Specifically,
the growing involvement of criminal law enforcement officials—especially local
law enforcement officers—creates more opportunities for bad-actor employers to
suppress labor dissent by way of state criminal laws.22 Although many scholars
have done work at the intersection of labor and immigration law, and of
immigration law and criminal law, I explain that one area that we can ignore only
at our peril is the intersection of labor, immigration, and criminal law. I then
conclude.

I. ASYMMETRIC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
For the last quarter century, our nation’s interior immigration
enforcement strategy has been fixated on employers and has tried to prevent them
from hiring unauthorized migrants. This Part teases out one strand of this history
21.
One example to which these scholars often point is a pro-energy agency
ignoring its congressionally imposed environmental obligations, with the solution being to
empower pro-environmental agencies to act as a monitor—an agency that encourages (and
in some cases forces) the lead agency to account for the environmental consequences of its
decisions. See infra Part II.
22.
See infra Part IV.
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that has often been overlooked: Congress envisioned this strategy to be jointly
implemented by immigration agencies and labor agencies. In practice, however,
immigration agencies—first the Immigration and Naturalization Service and now
ICE—have been able to dictate the terms of this interagency relationship.
Moreover, traditional administrative fixes, like presidential monitoring and agency
splitting, have proven to be ineffective.
A. Workplace Enforcement and Interagency Coordination
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986.23 One
of its central purposes was to target employers as a part of the federal strategy to
deter unauthorized migration. Prior to 1986, employers could hire workers without
regard to immigration status. Thereafter, employers were prohibited from hiring
workers without first verifying their immigration status. Failing to carry out these
verification duties could result in civil penalties, and knowingly hiring
unauthorized workers could lead to criminal penalties.24 The decision to target
employers was grounded in the logic that prohibiting employers from hiring
unauthorized migrants would disable the “magnet” that attracted unauthorized
migrants in the first place.25
By disabling this magnet, Congress endeavored to both deter
unauthorized migration and protect U.S. workers against the harm of depressed
wages caused by an influx of unauthorized workers willing to work for less.
Preventing employers from hiring unauthorized workers would dry up job
opportunities, which would remove any incentive for the unauthorized worker to
migrate in the first place. At the same time, regulating hiring decisions also
constricted an employer’s ability to exploit workers—authorized and unauthorized.
Lawmakers were well aware of the administrative challenges of
implementing the employer sanctions provision. Three in particular stood out.
First, although IRCA’s sanctions provision applied to all U.S. employers, it would
have been impossible for the INS to audit even a significant minority of U.S.
employers.26 Resource, time, and political constraints required the INS to make
hard choices among a variety of potential enforcement targets. As a result, there

23.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
24.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2006) (summarizing the grounds of liability); id. §
1324a(e)(4)–(5) (summarizing civil penalties); id. § 1324a(f) (summarizing criminal
penalties).
25.
For a more comprehensive history of IRCA and employer sanctions
generally, see Lee, supra note 12, at 1110–13, 1126–37; Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting
the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
193, 198–204.
26.
This challenge persists today given the large number of unauthorized
immigrants within U.S. borders. As Jeffrey Manns observes, “[ICE] lacks the manpower,
resources, and means to track down on its own the vast majority of undocumented aliens
who do not register.” Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of
Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 937.
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was an overriding sense that the INS would and should target employers in those
industries most dependent on unauthorized labor.27
A second concern was whether the INS was adequately equipped to
effectively carry out IRCA’s new enforcement mandate against employers. Up
until that point, the INS’s enforcement efforts focused primarily on unauthorized
immigrants. Targeting employers meant that the INS staff needed to reorient their
efforts to focus on citizens, and indeed, required changing and supplementing
agency staff.28 In the years immediately following IRCA’s passage, the INS
tailored its hiring priorities in order to build a staff with the requisite expertise to
carry out this new mandate.
Third and finally, the legislative activity surrounding the passage of
IRCA suggests that Congress anticipated coordination problems, and accordingly,
created a regulatory scheme that involved collaborations across the administrative
state.29 The legislative history reflects a congressional desire for this new set of
immigration laws to mesh with existing labor laws.30 Equally clear was Congress’s
desire for the INS to work with the DOL in developing an enforcement strategy.
Employers who sought out unauthorized workers often did so because such a
workforce tended to be more compliant and less likely to assert labor rights.
27.
IRCA was largely based on the findings of the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy. See Lee, supra note 12, at 1133 n.109; see also U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY
(1981).
28.
See Lee, supra note 12, at 1127 (describing the INS’s preference for hiring
high-achieving college graduates to replace former border patrol guards in order to foster a
more professional and civil relationship with employers as it attempted to implement
IRCA).
29.
See Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality
of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 442–43
(2011).
30.
The House Judiciary Committee Report explains:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions
provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor
protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor
relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy
unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for
exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities
protected by existing law.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662; see
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8–9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758
(“[T]he committee does not intend that any provision of this Act would limit the powers of
State or Federal labor standards agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, or Labor
arbitrators, in conformity with existing law, to remedy unfair practices committed against
undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in
activities protected by these agencies. To do otherwise would be counter-productive of our
intent to limit the hiring of undocumented employees and the depressing effect on working
conditions caused by their employment.”).
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Therefore, given the likelihood that an employer who violates U.S. immigration
laws (by hiring unauthorized workers) would also violate U.S. labor laws (by
exploiting those workers), the legislative history strongly suggests that Congress
intended for the DOL to play a complementary role in regulating employers.31
Indeed, IRCA explicitly empowered the DOL to review an employer’s
immigration-related documents as a part of its labor enforcement efforts.32
Another provision further supports the conclusion that Congress intended
for a collaborative process to prevail in the implementation of employer sanctions.
IRCA contained a self-study reporting provision, which requires the President to
produce a “comprehensive immigration-impact report” every three years.33 The
congressional commentary surrounding this provision reflects Congress’s
preference for coordinated enforcement efforts. The presidential reporting
requirement was designed, in part, to remedy the informational problems
associated with a decentralized immigration system that relied on four separate
cabinet-level agencies to implement immigration-related policy.34 Given the
entrenched interests of each agency, the House Report observed: “Because of this
diversification and the importance attached by each to its responsibilities, any
attempt to establish meaningful flexibility in this country’s immigration program is
difficult.”35 After summarizing and bemoaning the various failed attempts to
consolidate immigration authority into a single entity, the House Report concluded
that the President’s triennial findings would enable the political branches “to
consider possible changes to them with the benefit of reliable and detailed data.”36
Therefore, the allocation of worksite enforcement authority to both immigration
and labor agencies was driven in part to encourage agencies to coordinate their
efforts to overcome the regulatory challenges attendant to a fragmented
immigration system.
31.

The House Judiciary Committee Report notes:
In order to assist employers in meeting their responsibilities under this
legislation, the Attorney General is required to develop and disseminate
forms to employers, referrers and recruiters. These forms will then be
executed by employers, referrers and recruiters, as well as the person
employed or referred and retained for inspection by INS and the
Department of Labor.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 56–57 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5660–
61 (emphasis added).
32.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3) (2006) (“After completion of such form in
accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2), the person or entity must retain a paper, microfiche,
microfilm, or electronic version of the form and make it available for inspection by officers
of the Service, the Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices,
or the Department of Labor . . . .” (emphasis added)).
33.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 401(a),
100 Stat. 3359, 3440 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (2006)).
34.
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 89 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5693 (noting that immigration policies are carried out by the
Departments of State, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Labor). Today, five cabinetlevel agencies now regulate immigration with the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
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B. Asymmetric Enforcement Power
Both ICE and the DOL lay claim to important regulatory authority over
employers in terms of dealings with unauthorized workers. Under U.S.
immigration laws, ICE has the power to punish employers for hiring unauthorized
workers.37 Under U.S. labor laws—most relevantly the Fair Labor Standards Act38
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act39—the DOL has the power to punish
employers for workplace violations such as the nonpayment of overtime pay or
exposing workers to unsafe conditions. In theory, this regulatory overlap creates
conditions amenable to the joint, robust, and balanced policing of the workplace.
In practice, however, the regulation of the workplace has been skewed in favor of
immigration enforcement goals. Labor enforcement goals, to the extent they are
considered at all, are often relegated to being an afterthought. This asymmetric
allocation of power has allowed ICE to dictate whether and to what extent labor
enforcement goals are met. As I explain below, the DOL has been largely
powerless to disrupt this arrangement because of the different information-related
challenges facing each agency.
The DOL relies heavily on worker-initiated complaints to identify
potential bad-actor employers. Therefore, a key part of the DOL’s regulatory
strategy involves conveying accurate information to unauthorized workers about
the beneficial services it offers. For obvious reasons, ICE does not rely on (nor
does it expect) unauthorized workers to report employers. The very nature of
ICE’s law enforcement mission often leads it to employ campaigns of
misinformation—elaborate ruses designed to lure unauthorized immigrants out of
the shadows and into the open for detention and deportation. The tension generated
by these very different approaches often has the effect of sending mixed signals to
unauthorized immigrants, which ultimately impedes the DOL’s ability to reach and
gain the trust of unauthorized workers harmed in the workplace.
Unauthorized immigrants do not often interact with public entities or
other “law-wielding” entities. They avoid them. This, I am sure, surprises no one.
But what might be underappreciated is the degree to which this distrust of
immigration officials impedes the ability of “status-indifferent” or “status-neutral”
public entities to help unauthorized migrants assert their rights. By “statusindifferent,” I mean those agencies that are interested in helping unauthorized
immigrants assert their rights or obtain benefits to which they are entitled without
regard to their immigration status. Several agencies and institutions have no
interest in a person’s immigration status, nor should they in the vast majority of
cases. The challenge for these agencies, then, is to find ways to signal to
37.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (prohibiting the hiring of
“unauthorized” noncitizens and imposing a mandatory verification requirement on all
employers). An employer may also be punished for recruiting unauthorized migrants for
work. See id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (subjecting to criminal penalties anyone who “encourages
or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of
law”).
38.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
39.
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006).
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unauthorized migrants that receiving help and aid from these agencies will not lead
to adverse immigration consequences.
Although immigration scholars are at the very early stages of developing
a full picture of how unauthorized immigrants receive and sort information,40 a
patchwork of reports, studies, and articles provides an important and useful
glimpse of the challenges agencies and other entities face in reaching unauthorized
immigrants. Consider the following examples. The Census Bureau is housed in the
Department of Commerce and carries out the decennial task of gathering
information about the U.S. population and economy. Encountering information
pertaining to an individual’s immigration status is incidental to the Census
Bureau’s primary task of ensuring an accurate accounting of the national
population. But unauthorized immigrants are often unsure of this fact, thus
requiring the Bureau to actively work to convey to residents that any information
pertaining to their unauthorized status will not be shared with ICE.41 The costs of
conveying this “friendly” message are borne in specific ways, especially as those
messages confront the challenges of working across language differences. Even if
an unauthorized immigrant is willing to complete a census survey, getting the
process started requires having bilingual speakers. In multi-racial and multi-ethnic
Queens, New York, for example, census workers have been forced to go out in
groups that possess at least one Mandarin and one Korean speaker.42
State and local law enforcement entities have also grappled with the
challenges of communicating with and responding to the needs of immigrant
communities. Despite all of the attention that state and local entities have received
for the anti-immigrant ordinances passed by certain localities,43 the reality is much
more complicated. Indeed, many state and local law enforcement officers have
exhibited ambivalence toward the local enforcement of immigration laws.
Although mainstream understandings of this issue tend to paint local law
enforcement officials as openly embracing the responsibility of enforcing
immigration laws,44 the reality is that police departments are much more mixed on
the issue. A 2008 national study surveyed police chiefs from all around the country
and found that more than half of the respondents characterized gaining the trust of
immigrant communities as a priority for fear that failing to maintain such trust

40.
See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 341, 387–89 (2008) (identifying some areas of immigration law that could benefit
from a more robustly developed set of information policies in relation to immigrants).
41.
See Fernanda Santos, Door to Door, City Volunteers Try to Break Down
Resistance to the Census, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at A15 (“Illegal immigrants must be
told, sometimes repeatedly, that the Census Bureau does not share information about
individuals with any other government agency.”).
42.
See id.
43.
See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
2037, 2055–56 (2008) (summarizing some recent efforts).
44.
See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Law Is Stoking Unease Among
Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A11.
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would dry up community contacts, which are often the gatekeepers for
investigating local street crimes.45
Banks have also been active in trying to pierce through the veil of
distrust. Unlike the Census Bureau and local law enforcement agencies, whose
interest in unauthorized migrants flows from a broadly-conceived public mandate,
banks, as private actors, are interested in unauthorized immigrants for their
potential as consumers of financial services.46 Still, although banks are not public
entities, they provide financial services that enable unauthorized workers to access
and enjoy a more mainstream version of American social life. This, in part,
explains why federal bank regulators have repeatedly stated that banks are not
required to make distinctions on the basis of immigration status.47
In theory, expanding the distribution of information could help correct
unauthorized migrants’ mistaken (but understandable) belief that no public entity
says what it means or does what it says. One might be tempted to conclude that the
Census Bureau and the police need only get their message out and dial up their
public relations campaigns. In other areas of the law, institutions—both private
45.
See SCOTT H. DECKER ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV., IMMIGRATION AND LOCAL
POLICING: RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES 2
(2008), available at http://ccj.asu.edu/research/immigration-research-section/currentproject/immigration-and-local-policing-results-from-a-national-survey-of-law-enforcementexecutives/view. Sanctuary policies represent the most robust of this kind of local
sentiment. A recent study by the Homeland Security Advisory Council confirms this
finding. In a study evaluating the effects of the federal government’s Secure Communities
program, the Council observed that the program had unintended local impacts:
Secure Communities and other federal enforcement and removal
programs do no operate in a vacuum. In many localities, police leaders
have said that immigration enforcement policies are disrupting police–
community relationships that are important to public safety and national
security. Law enforcement experts have stated that the trust that exists
between police and immigrant communities can take years to develop
and can remain tenuous despite the hard work of local law enforcement
agencies.
HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TASK FORCE
ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2001), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-andrecommendations-report.pdf; see also Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61
SMU L. REV. 133, 133–37 (2008).
46.
Instead of seeking to build a trusting relationship with unauthorized migrants
for the benefit of authorized immigrant and citizen members of the community, banks’
profit-maximizing impulse has kept their focus squarely on the unauthorized. As Ezra
Rosser notes, “Today big banks, hungry for new growth areas, are clamouring to offer wiretransfer services to immigrants.” Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1,
32 (2008) (quoting Into the Fold: Americans Without Bank Accounts, ECONOMIST, May 6,
2006, at 76).
47.
These regulators, for the most part, seem to be agnostic toward the issue of
banking the unauthorized, but to the extent they support it, it seems that mainstreaming
these financial relationships facilitates the detection of fraud and money laundering. See
John Coyle, The Legality of Banking the Undocumented, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 21, 44–45
(2007).
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and public—often send signals that help decision-makers make better decisions.48
But the challenge faced by entities like the Census Bureau, certain local police,
and banks, is that when they send signals into the world, they can never be sure
that they reach their intended audience. How can one tell whether someone is
unauthorized, authorized, a citizen, or a noncitizen? And with the patchwork of
agencies carrying out immigration-related duties, unauthorized immigrants have a
hard time discerning which signals are genuine and which conceal ulterior
motives. Thus, a dilemma emerges: Status-blind agencies speak but can never be
sure who is listening, while unauthorized immigrants are listening, but can never
be sure who is speaking.
Even if a public entity is willing to internalize the costs of disseminating
its friendly message, there is no guarantee that the intended audience will play the
role of willing recipient. Immigrants can develop negative views and
preconceptions toward public officials in their sending countries, which can
foment distrust of U.S. officials. The challenge of breaking down the preconceived
notion held by immigrants is not entirely unfamiliar to regulators. It is often
articulated in terms of being a problem of culture or, more specifically, of
immigrants having to overcome cultural barriers. Although there are dangers to
relying too heavily on the explanatory powers of culture,49 where an immigrant
hails from a country where corruption pervaded public life and where police
officers and bank officials were viewed as the causes and beneficiaries of this
corruption, she might reasonably conclude that similar officials cannot be trusted
in the United States.50 In the parallel context of providing the benefits of police
48.
See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look”
Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 767–75 (2006) (arguing that in the context of hard
look review of administrative decisions, agencies can signal to reviewing courts their strong
endorsement of a proposed policy by developing a high-quality record); see also Russell
Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective
Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 409 (1998) (arguing that one underappreciated
function served by the U.S. News & World Report law school rankings is that they enable a
high-achieving student to signal to future employers that “he is brainy or clever enough to
be accepted by a more selective school”).
49.
Leti Volpp makes the important point that cultural explanations, especially
those that characterize immigrants as deviant, can be problematic for reasons of
essentialism. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181,
1186–87 (2001).
50.
Indeed, this is a part of the guidance that police officers receive to prepare
for policing in immigrant communities. For example, one set of guidelines explains:
A lack of trust towards government and public institutions, particularly
banks, is shared by many immigrant groups. Because of the sometimes
corrupt and unstable situations in their native countries, immigrants
oftentimes do not trust banks to safeguard and protect their money. As a
result, many immigrants keep their money and valuables at home or at
their businesses, thus making them vulnerable to crime.
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION
ISSUES 21 (2007), available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Publications/
PoliceChiefsGuidetoImmigration.pdf; see also DECKER ET AL., supra note 45, at 4 (“Gaining
cooperation . . . from immigrants, whether in the country legally or not, can be a difficult
issue for law enforcement, which may face distrust, fear, or hostility from such groups.”).
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protection, “immigrants are less likely than the general population to report to the
police situations in which they have been victims or witnesses to crime.”51
Given these informational challenges, those agencies whose investigative
responsibilities depend on the cooperation of unauthorized immigrants are at a
distinct disadvantage to those agencies that can carry out their missions
independent of such cooperation. The DOL is uniquely dependent on tips, leads,
and other external sources of information for initiating workplace investigations.
Although it possesses the authority to investigate employers based on internally
developed information, the majority of the DOL’s investigations begin in response
to complaints filed by workers alleging labor violations against their employers.52
Therefore, should the practice of reporting bad-actor employers be chilled—which
happened in the past in response to certain ICE enforcement strategies—one
practical consequence would be that employers could violate the labor rights of
their unauthorized workers knowing that there was little to no chance of being
investigated. In this way, the regulatory power wielded by the DOL and ICE is
asymmetric. In theory, each agency possesses independent and equally legitimate
authority to regulate employer relationships with unauthorized workers, but the
reality has been that ICE dictates whether and to what extent the DOL is able to
punish employers for exploiting their unauthorized workers.
The enforcement practices of the previous administration provide the
clearest example of such a dynamic. Under the Bush administration, ICE
implemented an employer-friendly workplace enforcement strategy under which it
largely ignored bad-actor employers and, in fact, welcomed tips and leads from
employers even when the surrounding facts strongly suggested that they were
reporting the very unauthorized workers they hired in the first place.53 This
practice, not surprisingly, had the effect of inducing a compliant and exploitable
workforce, but it also exacerbated the DOL’s already difficult task of building trust
with unauthorized workers. Indeed, as a general matter, the DOL has sought to
distance itself from ICE for fear that it would be mistaken for sharing the same

51.
DECKER ET AL., supra note 45, at 4. Generally speaking, it is not uncommon
for different groups to be informed by different networks of information. In a recent work,
Russell Robinson makes just such claims in developing his theory of perceptual
segregation—i.e., the phenomenon that blacks and whites can witness the same personal
interaction, but come away with entirely different conclusions as to that interaction’s racial
implications. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1120–22 (2008). He explains that blacks and whites not uncommonly develop notions and
theories on race in different environments. Id. In describing a world in which blacks and
whites access “racialized pools of information,” id. at 1122, Robinson’s observations help
explain why an unauthorized migrant may live in the United States for years and still exhibit
reluctance to trust or interact with public entities.
52.
One U.S. Government Accountability Office report estimates that nearly
three-fourths of all DOL investigations originate with a complaint. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-962T, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: BETTER USE OF
AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND CONSISTENT REPORTING COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE 7
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08962t.pdf.
53.
See Lee, supra note 12, at 1120–23.
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interests as immigration enforcement agencies.54 Without the benefit of workers
calling in complaints, identifying specific bad-actor employers becomes all the
more difficult, leaving the DOL with blunter investigatory instruments, such as
random audits. Given the imperfect nature of the information flowing through
immigrant communities, unauthorized migrants are just as likely to see these sorts
of interagency collaborations as adverse to their interests rather than for what they
really are.55 These stories punctuate the point that, in many cases, an unauthorized
immigrant need not have actually had a negative interaction with public entities to
develop a distrust of them. Even second-hand experiences, those that come to the
employee via organizational networks, can have the effect of pushing unauthorized
immigrants deeper into the margins of society.56
C. The Shortcomings of Traditional Fixes
In theory, the regulation of workplaces should be a joint endeavor with
input from both immigration enforcement and labor enforcement agencies. In
practice, however, such an arrangement has been hard to realize. Here, I explain
why two traditional fixes—executive monitoring and agency splitting—provide
incomplete solutions to the challenges of interagency coordination.
54.
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,
Richard M. Stana, Director of Justice Issues at the GAO, stated:
Labor officials will not delve into worksite immigration matters if it
would have a detrimental effect on Labor’s primary mission of enforcing
worker protection laws. If employees perceived that Labor investigators
were trying to determine their immigration status and possibly report
those who may be unauthorized to INS, it would have a “chilling effect”
on employees’ willingness to report workplace violations.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-861T, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING THE INS INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 7 (2002)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02861t.pdf.
55.
As one labor organizer observed, “Each agency attracts their [sic] own
audience. For example, if the DOL holds a community meeting, no one will attend. [The
community] sees the INS as government, and synonymous with all other government
agencies.” Shannon Gleeson, Organizing for Immigrant Labor Rights: Latino Immigrants in
San Jose and Houston, in CIVIC HOPES AND POLITICAL REALITIES: IMMIGRANTS,
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 107, 121 (S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan & Irene Bloemraad eds., 2008) (second alteration in original).
56.
Work on legal readings—the meaning that people attach to those legal
structures based on their experiences and perspectives—helps clarify this point. In the
context of workplace antidiscrimination policies, Fuller, Edelman, and Matusik explain that
such policies are designed “to signal legitimacy” or “to send a message of compliance with
law and some degree of fairness.” Sally Riggs Fuller et al., Legal Readings: Employee
Interpretation and Mobilization of Law, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 200, 205 (2000). If the
signaled message of fairness deviates from the employee’s discrimination-imbued reality,
the employee is likely to judge the employer (the legal structure) more harshly. See id. For
this reason, state labor entities are not uncommonly seen as more trustworthy from the
perspective of the unauthorized immigrant community. As Shannon Gleeson observes,
“Compared to federal agencies, . . . state agencies are the preferred route because of their
more robust protections, increased accessibility, and a lingering concern over potential
information sharing between federal agencies and immigration authorities.” Gleeson, supra
note 55, at 119.
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1. Constraints on Executive Oversight
Ordinarily, when an agency begins veering from its mission, the
Executive can right the course through its oversight powers. But a variety of
constraints prevent the Executive from effectively overseeing ICE workplace
enforcement decisions.
As a constitutional matter, the President’s primary form of oversight is his
ability to influence the heads of agencies through the appointment power.57
Administrative law scholars have explained that Presidents can influence agencies
through a variety of sub-constitutional channels as well.58 But as the history of
workplace enforcement has shown, the Executive faces real constraints when
trying to steer enforcement strategy.
Soon after taking office, President Obama offered some initial thoughts
on the kind of reform he envisioned. Importantly, he acknowledged that employers
often “us[e] illegal workers in order to drive down wages—and often times
mistreat those workers.”59 But what was of particular interest to defenders of
immigrant rights everywhere was what the President said next. Even while the
nation awaited comprehensive immigration reform, President Obama assured us
that administrative changes were afoot: “DHS is already in the process of cracking
down on unscrupulous employers, and, in collaboration with the Department of
Labor, working to protect those workers from exploitation.”60 The President has
57.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law . . . .”).
58.
For example, Presidents can issue formal directives, which are “generally
styled as memoranda to the heads of departments[] instructing one or more agencies to
propose a rule or perform some other administrative action within a set period of time.”
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2285 (2001). In less
formal ways, Presidents can nudge agency action with speeches, ceremonies, news
conferences, and radio addresses. Id. at 2299. Kagan explains that this was particularly true
of President Clinton:
In event after event, speech after speech, Clinton claimed ownership of
administrative actions, presenting them to the public as his own—as the
product of his values and decisions. He emerged in public, and to the
public, as the wielder of “executive authority” and, in that capacity, the
source of regulatory action.
Id. at 2300. Far from acting as a mere overseer of agency processes and policy choices,
which some have argued best describes the role that the President ought to play in the
administrative state, on Kagan’s account, Presidents have increasingly acted like and held
themselves out as “deciders.” See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider?” The
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 745 (2007).
59.
President Barack Obama, Remarks After Meeting with Members of
Congress to Discuss Immigration (June 25, 2009) (transcript available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-after-meetingwith-members-of-Congress-to-discuss-immigration).
60.
Id. It remains to be seen how long this will last. Having assumed control of
the House of Representatives, Republicans have signaled a desire to return to targeting
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repeatedly signaled to defenders and advocates of immigrants’ rights that his
administration will use labor law and policy to inform immigration law and policy.
As he envisions it, ICE and the DOL will come together and create a workplace
enforcement regime that jointly regulates employers for “hiring and exploiting”
unauthorized workers.61 The numbers seem to bear out the President’s vision.
Since President Obama has taken office, the number of worksite raids has
diminished. During fiscal year 2009, for example, the number of unauthorized
immigrants arrested through worksite raids dropped 70%, from 5184 to 1644,
while the number of employers who have been audited has doubled to 1444.62 But
this shift in workplace enforcement strategy is not nearly as strident as these
numbers suggest. Three reasons should give us pause.
First, although President Obama’s employer-centric approach to worksite
enforcement better comports with IRCA’s overall purpose than President Bush’s
worker-focused approach, the total numbers of investigations are still quite modest
in historical terms.63 Second, this renewed focus on employers must compete with
the ongoing enforcement goal of targeting criminal noncitizens.64 Put differently,
even as the President shifts priorities within workplace enforcement policy, such a
shift must work against an overall congressional preference to punish criminal
noncitizens. This is a trend that began in the years immediately following the
workers instead of employers. See Brian Bennett, Republicans Want a Return to Workplace
Immigration Raids, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/
nation/la-na-immigration-raids-20110127.
61.
See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Comprehensive Immigration
Reform (July 1, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform) (“That’s why businesses
must be held accountable if they break the law by deliberately hiring and exploiting
undocumented workers. We’ve already begun to step up enforcement against the worst
workplace offenders.” (emphasis added)); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, ICE STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2014, at 6 (2010), available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/strategic-plan/strategic-plan-2010.pdf
(“[E]nforcing the immigration-related employment laws is a critical component of border
security. . . . Criminal investigations will increasingly focus on employers who abuse and
exploit workers or otherwise engage in egregious conduct.” (emphasis added)).
62.
See N.C. Aizenman, Latinos Increasingly Critical of Obama’s Record on
Immigration, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/03/19/AR2010031904676.html.
63.
Testifying before Congress in October 2011, Deputy Director John Morton
indicated that ICE had already investigated over 3000 workplaces. See U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement: Priorities and the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5
(2011) (statement of John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
By contrast, in 1990, the INS investigated nearly 10,000 employers. See Peter Brownell,
The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 2005),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=332.
64.
Recent enforcement guidelines issued by DHS “reflect[] a renewed
Department-wide focus targeting criminal aliens and employers who cultivate illegal
workplaces by breaking the country’s laws and knowingly hiring illegal workers.” Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Worksite Enforcement Strategy (Apr.
30, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/worksitestrategy.pdf.
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passage of IRCA. Although the INS had a fresh mandate to target employers, with
an increasing national focus on criminal immigrant offenders, and the relative ease
with which those offenders could be identified and deported, the INS found itself
in a position to obtain supplemental funding to pursue those immigrants tied up in
drug trafficking. In 1988, just two years after the passage of IRCA, the INS
received $52.4 million to bolster its officer core and buy equipment to monitor the
border.65 In 1989, the INS received another $16.9 million, also to be used toward
drug enforcement—an amount that comprised 84% of the increase in
congressional appropriations received by the INS that year.66
Third and finally, it is almost certainly the case that shifting workplace
enforcement in a more labor-centric direction will require more than the occasional
directive. The growing anecdotal evidence paints a picture of immigration agency
officials resisting anything other than heavy-handed law enforcement tactics.67 In
other words, even as Presidents and high-ranking administration officials change,
agencies and their bureaucrats largely stay the same. In the dawning weeks of the
Obama administration, ICE officers raided Yamato Engine Specialists in
Bellingham, Washington without notifying DHS’s central office.68 ICE had
previously arrested an unauthorized immigrant with a criminal history who had
worked at Yamato, which led to an investigation and the eventual raid. That same
day, ICE issued a press release touting this raid as a part of ICE’s “dramatically
enhanced . . . efforts to combat the unlawful employment of illegal aliens in the
United States.”69 Although DHS Secretary Napolitano eventually ordered a review
of that incident, and of immigration enforcement guidelines generally, the
65.
See Jason Juffras, IRCA and the Enforcement Mission of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, in THE PAPER CURTAIN, supra note 3, at 33, 49.
66.
Id. Today, federal immigration crimes comprise more than half of the federal
criminal docket. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. L. REV. 1281,
1281–82 (2010).
67.
This conclusion becomes even firmer when considering the historical
ambivalence toward labor consequences evinced by ICE’s predecessor agency, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. See CALAVITA, supra note 8, at 131–36.
68.
In a similar act of defiance, during the early days of the Obama
administration, a district director in the state of Washington ordered a raid of a
manufacturing plant and issued a press release touting this act, despite the President’s shift
in workplace enforcement policy. See Manuel Valdes, Napolitano Orders Review
of
Bellingham
Immigration
Raid,
SEATTLE
TIMES,
Feb.
25,
2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008785918_webraid25m.html. Upset by
this administration’s approach to immigration enforcement, the union representing ICE
agents cast a unanimous “vote of no confidence” and demanded the resignation of ICE’s
director, John Morton. Jerry Seper, Agents’ Union Disavows Leaders of ICE; Sees Support
for “Amnesty,” WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at 1; see also Jerry Markon, Calls For His
Resignation ‘Just Part of the Territory,’ Says ICE Director Morton, WASH. POST, July 19,
2010, at A13; Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Nat’l Council 118 – Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Vote of No Confidence in ICE Director John Morton and ICE
ODPP Assistant Director Phyllis Coven (June 25, 2010), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/259-259-vote-no-confidence.pdf.
69.
Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 28 Illegal
Workers at Bellingham Company Arrested in ICE Operation (Feb. 24, 2009),
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0902/090224bellingham.htm.
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Bellingham example highlights how agencies—in the absence of costly oversight
and top-down executive directives—will pursue “low-hanging fruit.”70
Questions of implementation have persisted throughout President
Obama’s tenure in office. As Congress continues to suffer from legislative
gridlock, the President has tried to achieve through administrative channels what
Congress refuses to correct through statutory reform. For example, in August
2011, the President announced that DHS would review removal cases involving
noncitizens without criminal records71 and high-achieving, undocumented youth
on a case-by-case basis.72 Importantly, those noncitizens who receive the benefit of
this exercise of discretion become eligible for work authorization.73 While this
policy shift sends a friendly signal to the President’s constituents—immigrants’
rights activists and sympathizers—the results of implementation have thus far been
mixed. Predictably, implementation efforts have been slowed by skepticism,
resentment, and resistance within ICE’s low-level workforce. A recent account
suggests that agents have found the guidelines to be unwieldy and at odds with
what they see as the fundamental purpose of immigration law—namely the
detention and removal of noncitizens.74 As a result, those noncitizens who have
gathered community support and garnered media attention seem to be faring well
under the policy shift,75 whereas the more anonymous members of the
70.
Ginger Thompson, Immigration Agents to Turn Their Focus to Employers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at A19; see also Valdes, supra note 68. ICE ultimately secured
convictions against some of the corporate directors of Yamato Engine Specialists. See Press
Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Directors of Washington Company
Plead Guilty to Felony Immigration Violations: Pair Admits They Allowed Submission of
False Immigration Forms for Employees (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/0908/090818seattle.htm.
71.
See Frequently Asked Questions on the Administration’s Announcement
Regarding a New Process to Further Focus Immigration Enforcement Resources on High
Priority Cases, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
about/offices/ero/pdf/immigration-enforcement-facts.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2011)
[hereinafter FAQ on High Priority Cases].
72.
In this regard, the policy is a response to Congress’s failure to pass the
DREAM Act, a bill that would allow high-achieving, undocumented college students and
graduates to adjust their status. See Robert Pear, Fewer Youths to Be Deported in New
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A1.
73.
See FAQ on High Priority Cases, supra note 71, at 2 (noting that while work
authorization is not automatic, “[p]er longstanding federal law, individuals affected by an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion will be able to request work authorization”).
74.
The president of the American Federation of Government Employees, the
union that represents ICE agents, has insisted that the guidelines “cannot be effectively
applied in the field” and are objectionable because they “take away officers’ discretion and
establish a system that mandates that the nation’s most fundamental immigration laws are
not enforced.” Julia Preston, Obama Policy On Deporting Used Unevenly, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2011, at A16. As one immigrant rights advocate observes, “This is a classic
example of leadership saying one thing and the rank and file doing another.” Id.
75.
For example, Manual Guerra, who has been fighting removal for the past
five years, was one of the first to benefit from the shift. See Julia Preston, U.S. Issues New
Deportation Policy’s First Reprieves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A15. Guerra is also a
high-achieving student, who has benefitted from the support of the wider “DREAMer”
community. See Gabriela Garcia, Great News! Dream Leader Manuel Guerra Will Stay in
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undocumented community remain at the mercy of individual officials in field
offices.76 Presidential oversight, therefore, provides a costly and incomplete
mechanism for harmonizing the immigration and labor enforcement goals that
arise in the workplace.
2. The Limits of Agency Splitting
Another prevalent mechanism for policing incompliant agencies is agency
splitting. Where an agency has difficulties reconciling multiple enforcement
responsibilities, splitting relieves the agency of the responsibility that most directly
conflicts with the agency’s primary mission orientation. This administrative fix
resolves the problem of conflict and tension by transferring enforcement
responsibilities to an agency that is unburdened by the conflict of interests. Most
people associate agency splitting with the federal government’s response to the
2010 BP oil spill,77 but such an administrative fix is actually quite familiar to
students and scholars of immigration law.
The history of immigration enforcement is filled with agency splitting and
reorganization. In 1913, Congress abolished the Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization and transferred its authority to two newly created administrative
entities: the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization.78 As the
nature of the subdivision would indicate, the Immigration Bureau was relieved of
any responsibility over those matters concerning the naturalization of noncitizens.
In response to this reorganization, the head of the newly created Immigration
Bureau commented that because the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
“never took an active part in the enforcement of [naturalization] laws . . . the
provision of law constituting the division of separate bureau is welcomed as a wise
adjustment of the public business.”79 In 1933, U.S. immigration agencies
underwent another significant reorganization. Twenty years after the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization was divided into two separate agencies—one
addressing immigration enforcement and the other overseeing naturalization—the
two agencies were reconsolidated to form the INS.80

the US, Says Attorney, CHANGE.ORG (Aug. 23, 2011), http://news.change.org/stories/greatnews-dream-leader-manuel-guerra-will-stay-in-the-us-says-attorney.
76.
See Susan Carroll, New Immigration Policy Too Late for Sick Teacher: Man
Deported to Spain Despite Clean Record, Job, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2011, at 1.
77.
As a part of its responsibilities, the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”)
was empowered to oversee both the revenue-collection process for oil rigs and the
enforcement of safety and environmental laws against those same rigs, goals that for
obvious reasons tend to conflict. In response to the spill, the federal government split apart
the MMS. John M. Broder, U.S. to Split Up Agency Policing the Oil Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2010, at A1.
78.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96TH CONG., HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 19 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE INS].
79.
See id. at 19–20.
80.
See Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933), available at
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/06166.html. While it
is not entirely clear why our immigration agencies were reorganized, a few reasons can be
inferred. For one thing, it apparently saved costs by evincing sensitivity to the growing
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In the INS, the public found a sense of continuity as that agency came to
regulate most of the major immigration-related activities. For 70 unbroken years,
even as structural changes occurred at the margins81 and as statutory law was
revised and perfected, the same agency absorbed mandates, chased regulatory
benchmarks, developed a mission orientation, and negotiated a work culture all its
own. In 2002, the INS was dissolved under the Homeland Security Act.82
Importantly, its dissolution was in part a response to the critique that an agency
that fulfilled both “enforcement” and “services” functions could not manage either
effectively.83 By separating out these functions, Congress signaled in unambiguous
terms that the primary purpose of the newly created ICE was the enforcement of
immigration laws against noncitizens.84 The reorganization ushered in by the
wariness of governmental waste. See HISTORY OF THE INS, supra note 78, at 41 (“When INS
was created, the annual budget of the two previously existing services was reduced by about
$1,500,000, necessitating a reduction in the workforce.”). For another, it seemed like a
response to the growing concern over the administrative challenges of naturalization. See id.
(noting that the reorganization “followed several years of concern by the Bureau of
Immigration that naturalization standards should be tightened”).
81.
In 1940, Congress transferred the INS into the Department of Justice and
although the transfer left the INS intact, it marked a shift in thinking. See Reorganization
Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, 53 Stat. 561. Although the regulatory challenges arising
from immigration were long conceived primarily in terms of work and labor, empowering
the DOJ to manage the INS (and its resources) signaled very clearly that immigration posed
an additional set of challenges associated with global conflict and national security. Beyond
worrying about whether immigrant workers were driving down wages for U.S. citizen
workers, the INS also faced the challenge of screening for and excluding, or detecting and
deporting, any foreign elements that might surreptitiously cross U.S. borders to threaten the
nation.
82.
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135,
2205 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 291 (2006)).
83.
See Eric Schmitt, Vote in House Strongly Backs an End to I.N.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at A1. The INS was empowered to serve two distinct sets of
functions—one involving what might be loosely characterized as an “enforcement” function
and another pertaining to a “services” function. The Homeland Security Act of 2002
abolished the agency and reallocated authority along these lines. See 6 U.S.C. § 291(a)
(2006) (abolishing the INS); id. § 542 (requiring the President to submit a reorganization
plan regarding the agencies affected by the Act). Importantly, the Act prohibited the
President from combining, joining, or consolidating the functions of the newly created
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and Bureau of Border Security,
the latter of which eventually became the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency. See
id. § 291(b). Our immigration system as currently designed, then, segregates enforcement
and services functions so that ICE serves the former function and USCIS fulfills the latter.
84.
After the passage of the House Bill approving the passage of the INS, thenAttorney General John Ashcroft remarked, “It is time to separate fully our services to legal
immigrants, who helped build America, from our enforcement against illegal aliens, who
violate the law.” Schmitt, supra note 83. Post-reorganization, ICE’s orientation surely
reflects this initial sentiment: “As the largest investigative arm of the [DHS, ICE]
aggressively uses critical immigration and customs authorities to protect the American
people from the illegal introduction of goods and the entry of terrorists and other criminals
seeking to cross our Nation’s borders.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF:
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 63 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
budget_bib_fy2010.pdf. It is worth pointing out that the enforcement–services distinction is
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Homeland Security Act was, therefore, a rejection of an immigration system where
an agency’s multiple goals threatened to undermine the effective pursuit of either
goal.
Against this history of reorganization, why not attempt a similar
reorganization in the context of workplace enforcement? Why not simply transfer
IRCA enforcement responsibility from ICE to the DOL? Some reform-minded
individuals have floated this exact idea.85 But in the context of workplace
enforcement, employing this fairly typical administrative fix would lead to the
counterintuitive result of likely weakening labor protections for unauthorized
migrants. An administrative experiment explored during the Clinton administration
suggests that this would almost certainly be the case. From 1992 to 1998, the INS
and the DOL coordinated their worksite enforcement efforts in such a way that
required the DOL to review employer records for immigration violations whenever

a loose one because there are inevitably some cases that defy easy characterization. See
David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act Reorganization: An
Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 601, 602 (2003)
(“[S]ome functions, particularly inspections at the ports of entry (which can include
attention to asylum claims), are not easily pigeonholed as either service or enforcement.”).
As one commission on immigration reform observed:
[P]lacing incompatible service and enforcement functions within one
agency creates problems: competition for resources; lack of coordination
and cooperation; and personnel practices that both encourage transfer
between enforcement and service positions and create confusion
regarding mission and responsibilities. Combining responsibility for
enforcement and benefits also blurs the distinction between illegal
migration and legal admissions.
Alternative Proposals to Restructure the Immigration and Naturalization Service: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 109–10 (1998) (statement of Susan Martin, Former Director, U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform); see also Martin, supra, at 602 (“Extensive reorganization of the INS
has been debated and planned for since at least 1998. Virtually all plans called for some
kind of split between immigration enforcement functions and immigration service
functions.” (citations omitted)).
85.
Peter Brownell has argued that empowering the DOL to play a “larger
enforcement role” in formulating immigration-related workplace enforcement policies
would improve workplace enforcement:
[B]ecause DOL has no mandate to enforce immigration laws directed
against aliens, there would be no temptation to shift a greater share of
enforcement resources toward that disenfranchised group. Rather, DOL
has understood for some time that the effective enforcement of labor law
requires that immigrants feel safe in calling to complain about labor
standards violations.
Brownell, supra note 63. Robert Bach and Doris Meissner have made a similar suggestion.
Bach & Meissner, supra note 3, at 299 (“The government’s modest level of resources for
sanctions could be leveraged more effectively if DOL inspectors had enforcement authority
similar to that of the INS.”). Meissner, of course, went on to become the INS commissioner
in the Clinton administration.
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it investigated worksites for wage and hour violations.86 By engaging in the direct
enforcement of immigration laws against individual employers, the DOL
unwittingly undermined its ability to enforce labor laws against employers more
generally.87 Therefore, empowering the DOL would be an improvement in
workplace enforcement to the extent that such an arrangement would better align
enforcement goals with mission orientation. Unlike ICE, the DOL has a long
history of regulating employers, so there would be no fear of agency shirking. But
transferring enforcement authority to the DOL would solve one problem while
creating another. Expanding the DOL’s enforcement authority would deter many
unauthorized migrants from reporting labor violations given that they would face
an unattractive menu of options: They can either continue to suffer labor violations
or report their employers to the DOL for these labor violations, which under this
arrangement would also invite scrutiny of the employer’s compliance with
immigration law. Therefore, expanding the DOL’s ability to directly regulate
employers for immigration violations—which agency splitting would do—solves
the shirking problem, but only at the cost of deterring unauthorized workers from
reporting labor violations committed by their employers.88

II. INTERAGENCY MONITORING
In the context of workplace enforcement, here is the central dilemma:
Although ICE is empowered to regulate employers in a manner that accommodates
labor goals, it tends to ignore these goals. Meanwhile, although the DOL enjoys
joint regulatory power in theory, the allocation of enforcement authority is
asymmetric in practice. Executive oversight can be costly, and agency splitting
proves to be not much of a solution at all. Giving the DOL direct immigration
enforcement authority would solve the agency-shirking problem, but only at the
risk of chilling the reporting of labor violations, which on balance would probably
weaken labor protections for unauthorized migrants.
But what if the DOL were given indirect enforcement authority? What if
workplace enforcement authority remained with ICE, but the DOL and other labor
agencies were empowered to monitor ICE’s enforcement decisions, thus indirectly
86.
See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., Dep’t of Justice, and the Employment Standards Admin., Dep’t of
Labor (June 11, 1992), reprinted in 113 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1.
87.
See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement
of International Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529, 547–48 (2002).
88.
Since 1998, the DOL has been prohibited from examining an employer’s
hiring records where the investigation arose from a complaint of labor violations. See
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Dep’t
of Justice, and the Employment Standards Admin., Dep’t of Labor (Nov. 23, 1998)
[hereinafter 1998 MOU], available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/emprights/
MOU.pdf. This information firewall helps insulate against the perception that labor agencies
share with immigration agencies the sensitive immigration-related information of workers.
See Philip Martin & Mark Miller, Employer Sanctions: French, German and U.S.
Experiences 34–35 (Int’l Migration Branch of Int’l Labour Office, Working Paper No. 36,
2000) (noting that during the 1990s, “the Department of Labor provided few tips to the INS
because it feared that workers would be afraid to cooperate in wage and other labour law
investigations”).
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affecting the outcome? Over the years, a body of literature has emerged where
scholars have grappled with questions of interagency coordination and have
focused on whether tinkering with agency arrangements can affect how any one
agency makes decisions.89 This scholarship is useful for helping to solve the
quandary presented by workplace enforcement. These scholars have framed the
problem as follows: Because agencies are saddled with multiple and often
conflicting goals, in some instances, empowering agencies (i.e., monitoring
agencies) to monitor the decisions of other agencies (i.e., lead agencies) can help
deter these lead agencies from pursuing certain enforcement or regulatory goals at
the expense of others. Environmental law scholars have been particularly sensitive
to this dynamic given that many pro-energy agencies, like the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), would almost certainly make decisions that
furthered energy goals at the expense of environmental ones if left to their own
devices.90 This theory tends to build on two interrelated observations: First, that
principals (like the Executive, Congress, and courts) have had mixed success in
influencing the actions taken by subordinate agencies;91 and second, that the
conflicting goals are so interrelated that transferring one goal to another agency is
rendered impracticable.92 Against this background, these scholars have argued that
agencies can fill this oversight gap. J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman have
demonstrated that enabling pro-environment federal and state agencies to serve an
ex ante monitoring function has forced FERC to consider environmental goals that
they would have otherwise ignored or of which they would have been ignorant.93
In this example, the monitoring agencies remind FERC of its environmental
obligations, thus preventing it from claiming ignorance and, at the very least,
forcing FERC to justify its actions.94
89.
See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of
Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1655 (2006); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003).
90.
See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2239–41 (2005) (describing how the FERC resisted or was blind to
the environmental effects of their decisions on account of agency culture and expertise).
91.
See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions
of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (“Economists and political
scientists have developed an extensive literature examining the problems of principal–agent
interactions, with specific applications for governmental and non-profit organizations. That
literature provides us with some important insights into the nature and logic of how
agencies tasked with multiple goals are likely to function.”); see also DeShazo & Freeman,
supra note 90, at 2241–52 (discussing the ways in which congressional, executive, and
judicial oversight have proven to be ineffective in ensuring that FERC take into account the
environmental consequences of its actions).
92.
See Biber, supra note 91, at 33–34 (describing the difficulty of separating
interconnected and interrelated goals).
93.
See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2222–28.
94.
See id. at 2272–80 (presenting empirical evidence that the passage of the
Electric Consumers Protection Act, which required FERC to consult certain proenvironment agencies, affected FERC’s compliance with its environmental obligations).
Eric Biber has pointed to examples where monitoring agencies wield more than hortatory
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Interagency monitoring, therefore, sets out to solve a particular type of
problem: Although Congress has empowered an agency to enforce a particular
mandate, that agency has ignored or otherwise shirked its duty to enforce that
mandate. A system of lateral oversight can help solve the shirking problem where
vertical oversight has proven to be ineffective (for whatever reason) and where the
mandate presents a mismatch with the agency’s primary mission orientation. If
agencies, over time, tend to evade their secondary obligations, one solution is to
empower other agencies to act as monitors. Within the interagency monitoring
framework, oversight responsibilities are assumed by an agency “that has a
different mission . . . that . . . will not interfere with, and may even promote,
innovation in the measurement of the ‘secondary’ goal.”95 As scholars have
pointed out, lateral monitoring schemes have appeared throughout the
administrative state and across decisionmaking schemes. In some cases, agencies
monitor relatively open licensing processes,96 while in other instances, agencies
are charged with monitoring the traditionally more cloistered process of
enforcement.97 The relative ubiquity of such schemes highlights the importance of
understanding how agencies interact with one another, and not just with the
political branches, courts, and the public.
In assessing an agency’s primary mission orientation, proponents of the
interagency monitoring framework in other contexts have tended to focus on a few
sources of information and agency characteristics. First, an agency’s enabling act
offers a natural starting point given that it provides the statutory justification for,
and structural blueprints to, an agency’s existence. It is particularly useful when
examining it both within the context of the historical circumstances leading up to
an enabling act’s passage and against subsequent acts imposing additional duties
onto the agency.98 Because agencies absorb additional responsibilities over time,
authority. In some instances, agencies have been subject to lawsuits for failing to comply
with certain mandates. See Biber, supra note 91, at 45–57.
95.
Biber, supra note 91, at 41. DeShazo and Freeman go a bit further and
recommend giving monitoring duties to agencies whose mandates not only do not conflict
with the decisionmaking agency’s secondary goal, but “which derive relevant expertise and
interests from their own statutory mandates, to lobby the implementing agency.” DeShazo
& Freeman, supra note 90, at 2221.
96.
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2267–70.
97.
For example, the EPA and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) are
both empowered to regulate pesticides in food. By statute, the EPA is empowered to set the
tolerable limits of “pesticide chemical residue,” 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (2006), while the
FDA is empowered by regulation to recall or seize food, or impose penalties, where food
contains such residue beyond tolerable limits, see 21 C.F.R. § 7.1 (2011). See also Keith
Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 750–51 (2011)
(describing this joint regulatory scheme).
98.
For example, in explaining the modern quandary that FERC faces, DeShazo
and Freeman tell a story that begins with FERC’s predecessor agency, the Federal Power
Commission (“FPC”). Created by Congress in 1920—a time well before the emergence of
the environmental movement—“[t]he FPC’s original statutory mission was unmistakably
propower.” DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2236. Although much of the public
today expects—and many environmental protection statutes require—those agencies to
consider the harmful environmental impact of their decisions, this was not the case for much
of those agencies’ histories. Well before the advent of the environmental protection
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an agency’s mission orientation can change in response to shifting political winds
and acts taken by subsequent Congresses. Assessing an agency’s bureaucratic
culture can also help fill in important details. Understanding how agencies and
their officials understand themselves—and how they perceive other agencies and
their officials—helps establish whether an agency exhibits preferences for certain
types of enforcement goals over others.99 Finally, an agency’s mission orientation
is often tied to the scope of its expertise. The FERC example is again instructive.
For several decades in the middle of the 20th century, the FERC maintained an
entire division of field personnel who were all professional engineers. By contrast,
during this same period, the FERC contained no division devoted to fisheries or
recreational interests that could weigh in on the environmental considerations
associated with a particular licensing proposal.100 In this sense, expertise captures
an agency’s capacity, as opposed to willingness, to take on and effectively
implement additional duties.
A mismatch occurs when a particular enforcement goal contradicts or
stands in tension with an agency’s mission orientation.101 The mismatch problem
presents a reality where “there are multiple sets of interests that a policy cannot
trade off against each other in a predictable way.”102 The nature of the enforcement
goals, and more importantly, the metrics used to measure the successful
implementation of those goals, can exacerbate this phenomenon. Eric Biber
suggests that over time, in the context of land management, enforcement
distortions will emerge that favor producing timber because the quantifiable nature

moment, it is clear that the FPC approached hydropower licensing decisions with a
distinctly propower bent. As DeShazo and Freeman observe, the FPC sought to “develop[]
hydropower to meet the needs of a growing economy,” and as history has shown, the
majority of licenses the FPC ultimately approved occurred during this period. Id. at 2237–
38; see also Biber, supra note 91, at 17–18 (explaining that the U.S. Forest Service was
created at the turn of the 20th century primarily to engage in timber production, which is an
objective that stands in tension with modern environmental goals of accounting for how
timber production decisions might adversely impact diversity of wildlife and plant species,
facilitate soil erosion, and taint scenery).
99.
See Richman, supra note 89, at 786–93 (describing the career trajectories
taken by federal investigative agents and federal prosecutors, the different acculturation
processes involved in each, and how this difference can lead to culture clashes).
100.
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2239. Creating no capacity to
generate or absorb the insights regarding the environmental consequences of licensing
decisions enabled the FERC to disregard this ambiguous set of duties in favor of pursuing a
propower agenda.
101.
One of criticisms levied against the FBI in the wake of 9/11 was the FBI’s
failure to gather intelligence. But the FBI’s culture was much more primed to serve a
traditional law enforcement function than it was to carry out an intelligence-gathering
mission, and indeed, as an agency, it was predisposed to taking a less-than-robust approach
to intelligence gathering. During the 1970s, abuses of civil liberties by the FBI had surfaced
and as a result, it began steering clear of domestic intelligence activities. See Luis Garicano
& Richard A. Posner, Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective, 19
J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 163–64 (2005).
102.
Bradley, supra note 97, at 773.
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of clear-cutting better lends itself to demonstrating agency success.103 Producing
timber generates a clear, unambiguous, and easily quantifiable outcome. By
contrast, whether or not a particular parcel of land has retained its aesthetic beauty
is an issue that can be resolved only through a subjective assessment relying on
largely qualitative factors.104
The methods of interagency monitoring vary. Some are hortatory. Others
subject the lead agency to the possibility of some greater set of consequences
ranging from political embarrassment105 to court-enforceable affirmative
obligations.106 But all interagency collaborations have the potential to create
uncomfortable moments, which is a part of the point. Forcing agencies to work
together pushes lifelong bureaucrats to confront their blind spots and biases and
often demands that they justify an action that they would otherwise never think to
explain.107 These relationships can have a stop-and-think effect on agency officials
and, over the long term, improve outcomes by introducing new perspectives,
which can help fight groupthink and mitigate the possibility of capture.108
Of course, interagency collaborations are not always antagonistic and can
evolve over time. What begins as an “unnatural act” can eventually establish a new
“natural.”109 Even while highlighting the cultural chasm that separates
investigative agents from prosecutors, Daniel Richman cautions against
“underestimat[ing] the unifying influence of a shared commitment to ‘getting the
bad guys,’ hardened by the adversarial process, nurtured by mutual respect and

103.
See Biber, supra note 91, at 25–27 (suggesting that the “readily quantifiable”
task of overseeing timber harvests and the largely subjective task of preserving “scenic and
aesthetic qualities” of affected lands interacted in a way that created a structural
environment that increased the attractiveness of timber production).
104.
See Biber, supra note 91, at 12–13. Luis Garicano and Richard Posner make
a similar argument in the context of combating terrorism. Garicano & Posner, supra note
101, at 164 (noting that the FBI’s investigative success has traditionally been measured in
terms of arrests and convictions, which matches up poorly with the enterprise of intelligence
gathering given that success in that context involves detecting plots before such activity
reaches the level of a prosecutable crime). The diminished capacity for oversight is often
one of the trade-offs involved in disaggregating enforcement authority. While such a design
handicaps a principal’s powers of oversight, it often creates a competitive environment
among agents, which creates incentives for the agents to produce better outcomes while
deepening and broadening their expertise. See Gersen, supra note 89, at 214–15 (arguing
that judicial deference is one reward that might be offered to agencies in exchange for
developing expertise in certain regulatory areas).
105.
See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 90, at 2235–36 (identifying political
embarrassment as one consequence of an agency failing to fulfill a statutory mandate).
106.
See Biber, supra note 91, at 52–57.
107.
See EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE
PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 232 (1998).
108.
See O’Connell, supra note 89, at 1675–78 (discussing the potential benefits
of having multiple agencies pursuing the same regulatory goal).
109.
Eugene Bardach explains, “Interagency collaboration, the joke goes, is an
unnatural act committed by non-consenting adults. Learning how to do it takes time and a
willingness to make the effort—even a willingness to understand that a problem exists for
which time and effort are required.” BARDACH, supra note 107, at 263.
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need, and on occasion lubricated by alcohol.”110 Ultimately, this highlights the
malleable and context-specific nature of conflict in the interagency context.
Although shared moral commitments and off-duty revelry may be enough to
overcome the differences separating federal prosecutors and investigative agents,
in other contexts more structured interactions may be needed in order to foster a
genuine culture change.

III. MONITORING WORKPLACE ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS
So far, I have endeavored to show that (1) workplace enforcement power
is distributed asymmetrically between immigration and labor agencies, in
significant part of because informational challenges; (2) the most obvious
administrative solutions are not viable options; and (3) similar regulatory problems
in other contexts have been dealt with through interagency arrangements where
one agency monitors the decisions of the lead agency. In this Part, I begin to make
the case that similar arrangements can help solve the asymmetry endemic to
workplace enforcement. I want to suggest that regulating the type of information
ICE relies on can help minimize the likelihood that immigration law will be coopted to displace labor law. I make this normative move with some level of
trepidation. In particular, I am sensitive to the fact that there is still much to be
learned in terms of how the DOL actually interacts with ICE and other
immigration enforcement agencies.111
At the same time, what we do know about the labor conditions
experienced by unauthorized workers and about the types of worksites that are
investigated for the presence of unauthorized workers112 strongly suggests that ICE
officials would not have considered investigating a particular worksite but for the
receipt of a tip or a lead. Moreover, President Obama’s shift in workplace
enforcement—choosing, in principle, to harmonize immigration and labor law,
instead of using the former to displace the latter—and the fading possibility of
comprehensive immigration reform make it worthwhile to have the normative
discussion to inform reform-minded individuals in a position to make prescriptive
changes.
A. Mission Mismatch
In the context of workplace enforcement, the reality has been that ICE
possesses a fair amount of autonomy in deciding how to implement this interior
enforcement strategy. This has been true since at least the middle of the 20th

110.
Richman, supra note 89, at 792.
111.
The most comprehensive examination of interagency coordination in the
context of the immigration enforcement in the workplace is Kitty Calavita’s excellent work
on the Bracero guestworker program, which was administered 50 years ago. See CALAVITA,
supra note 8. Any modern insights we could extrapolate from Calavita’s fine study would
be limited by both the sheer antiquity of that interagency experiment and the fact that the
INS has since been dissolved and replaced by DHS.
112.
See Lee, supra note 12, at 1120–23.
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century, when the INS and the DOL (along with the Departments of State and
Agriculture) jointly administered the Bracero guestworker program.113
Kitty Calavita’s Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration,
and the I.N.S. provides perhaps the most detailed examination of the INS’s inner
workings, and in particular, how it “wrangled” with other agencies like the DOL
over enforcement policies.114 Calavita traces out the different fault lines cutting
through our immigration system during the 1950s and 1960s. As she explains, the
INS faced
a bureaucratic dilemma related to its unenviable mandate to control
illegal immigration despite the powerful economic forces driving
that migration. Securing growers’ cooperation in using braceros
rather than illegal workers—cooperation that was contingent on the
INS providing growers with “a seemingly endless army of cheap,
unorganized workers”—was the immigration agency’s response to
this institutional dilemma.115

Particularly illuminating was Calavita’s review of the internal memoranda
and internal reports exchanged and compiled during the administration of the
program. These documents revealed clashing views of immigrants and the
overarching purpose of immigration regulation. For example, the DOL perceived a
general reluctance on the part of the INS to take seriously labor considerations
attendant to the presence of unauthorized workers.116 In the words of a former
Deputy General Counsel, “The INS doesn’t care about what labor unions think. By
and large, it’s a conservative organization.”117 By contrast, the INS was interested
in working with the DOL but only to the extent that doing so could help keep the
number of unauthorized migrants to a minimum.118
The kind of work culture an agency fosters and the management
structures it selects may prevent agency staff from fully appreciating the urgency
or significance of secondary goals. Since its creation in 1933, the INS employed
deportation as a key strategy in the pursuit of unauthorized immigrants. Then in
1986, more than 50 years after its inception, the INS inherited the responsibility of
113.
Admittedly, the challenges of administering a guestworker program and an
employer sanctions scheme are not identical. In particular, immigration officials can keep
track of and monitor workers in guestworker programs, whereas IRCA’s employer
sanctions scheme relieves immigration officials of this duty by foisting onto employers the
duty to screen and monitor workers. Still, the two programs pose similar regulatory
challenges to the extent that both are subject to manipulation by employers. It is on this
basis that I borrow observations about agency interactions developed in the Bracero context
to explain similar interactions in the modern employer sanctions context.
114.
See CALAVITA, supra note 8, at 113.
115.
Id. at 9.
116.
See id. at 145. “The INS reaction to unions was not confined to semantics,”
according to Calavita. Id. She explains that the INS willingly facilitated the entry of
guestworkers to provide relief for growers facing striking workforces. Id.
117.
Id.
118.
In response to the gradual dismantlement of the Bracero program, INS began
ramping up its efforts to detain and deport undocumented immigrants. Between 1965 and
1970, the number of apprehensions tripled. See id. at 151.
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punishing employers for immigration-related violations as a part of the
comprehensive changes generated by IRCA.119 Put differently, IRCA posed a new
enforcement challenge to the INS: It asked an agency, which had spent nearly half
a century building an expertise on how to detain, exclude, and deport noncitizens,
to begin regulating employers, who were almost always citizens.120 Moreover, this
set of enforcement targets wielded much more power and resources and, not
surprisingly, demonstrated a greater ability and willingness to protest.121 Taken
together, these dynamics suggest that the task of implementing an employercentric, interior enforcement strategy would require INS officials to expand the
boundaries of their traditional mission orientation.
The goal of transforming INS’s mission found something less than
resounding success. During the years immediately following the passage of IRCA,
the DOL sent referrals to the INS identifying employers who had been found to be
in violation of labor laws, which is useful information given the strong association,
within certain industries, between labor violations and immigration violations. But
some studies of the early post-IRCA years noted that there was rarely any followup on these referrals, and it further suggested that a part of the reason may have
been INS indifference or antagonism toward these referrals. Michael Fix and Paul
Hill found that the DOL’s complaint-driven approach to workplace investigation,
for example, may not have meshed with many INS offices, which embraced a
“police model” of simply raiding workplaces upon receiving a tip.122 As one INS
agent explained, “[The] DOL picks up paperwork violations, and we don’t do
paperwork violations.”123
B. Agency Coordination Without Agency Monitoring
Here, I discuss two important attempts to coordinate immigration and
labor enforcement activities. At a glance, these interagency arrangements evince
119.
Moreover, as I explain in other work, IRCA was the result of changing
public attitudes toward employers. As the public became increasingly concerned with the
growing unauthorized population, more and more states passed employer sanctions laws.
See Lee, supra note 12, at 1110–13. Employers shouldered a significant amount of blame
for public dissatisfaction with the immigration system as they were seen as benefitting from
and sometimes facilitating unauthorized migration. See id. at 1132–43.
120.
Id. at 1127 (describing INS’s attempts to change its workplace culture to
accommodate the new mandate).
121.
See Martin & Miller, supra note 88, at 32 (“[I]nstead of dealing primarily
with individuals who were often not US citizens and who tended not to protest poor service
and inconsistent advice, the INS in sanctions enforcement had to deal with US employers
who had in-house attorneys and often close contact with political leaders.”); see also Lee,
supra note 12, at 1113–19 (describing the challenges associated with immigration
screening); Wishnie, supra note 25, at 210 (“[E]mployer sanctions target employers, not
undocumented immigrants, by obligating employers to verify status and to refuse to hire
unauthorized workers. Federal immigration authorities have traditionally targeted noncitizens, however, and this reorientation may not be fully embraced within the immigration
agency . . . .” (emphasis added)).
122.
Michael Fix & Paul Hill, Implementing Sanctions: Reports from the Field, in
THE PAPER CURTAIN, supra note 3, at 65, 80–81.
123.
Id. at 80.
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some of the qualities arising from interagency monitoring arrangements developed
in other areas of law. But a closer look reveals that these shared qualities are in
appearance only. Immigration scholars have rightly pointed out that these
coordination attempts served to further suppress labor rights,124 but a point that has
not yet been given full expression is that this suppression can be traced to the
existence of only minimal monitoring power. As a result, ICE has for much of its
history evaded meaningful oversight in the context of workplace enforcement, and
it has tended to resist or ignore the labor consequences of its workplace
enforcement decisions.
One effort at coordinating immigration and labor enforcement goals has
involved restricting the kind of information on which ICE can rely in making
enforcement decisions. The Department of Justice’s 1996 issuance of Operating
Instruction 287.3a was designed to prevent the INS from “unknowingly becoming
involved in a labor dispute.”125 The instruction advised, but did not require, the
officer to affirmatively ask the informant whether a labor dispute was in progress
or to consult with the NLRB or the DOL as to whether the particular employer had
a history of labor violations. Importantly, the instruction reaffirmed its advisory
nature by acknowledging that ICE ultimately possesses the authority to enforce
immigration laws even where doing so would undermine labor protections.126
An example of the second type of interagency coordination has involved
Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”) harmonizing the various enforcement
goals of agencies. The INS and the DOL entered into just such a MOU in 1998.127
During the Clinton administration, the INS and the DOL made an effort to
coordinate their regulatory efforts, and the 1998 MOU detailed, among other
things, the kind of information the agencies would share with one another.128 It
noted in particular that the INS was required to share with the DOL any
information suggesting that a particular employer may have violated any laborrelated statutes falling within DOL’s jurisdiction.129 The wording of this provision
is ambiguous,130 and the anecdotal evidence suggests that ICE has alerted the DOL
only after a workplace has already been investigated.

124.
See Wishnie, supra note 87, at 547–48.
125.
INS Operations Instruction 287.3a, reprinted in 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES
199 (1997) [hereinafter O.I. 287.3a].
126.
See id. (“Generally there is no prohibition for enforcing the Immigration and
Nationality Act, even when there may be a labor dispute in progress.”).
127.
1998 MOU, supra note 88.
128.
It also explained that certain types of information would not be shared. For
example, the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division was required to review an employer’s
immigration-related documentation during the course of its own investigation except where
the investigation was based on a complaint alleging labor violations. See id. at 6.
129.
Id. at 7.
130.
See id. (“When INS obtains or receives information during the course of its
worksite enforcement activities which indicates a possible violation of statutes within the
jurisdiction of the DOL, the INS shall expeditiously notify the District Director of the
appropriate [Employment Standards Administration] field office covering the area in which
the suspected violation occurred.”).
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Both of these arrangements have failed to promote the goal of
harmonizing immigrant enforcement and labor enforcement goals because neither
gives labor officials meaningful monitoring authority. Neither the operating
instructions nor the MOU enables labor officials to force the uncomfortable
conversation needed to impose a stop-and-think effect on immigration officials. In
the absence of regular such interactions, even immigration officials with capacious
understandings of immigration enforcement can succumb to blind spots and
indifference, which can emerge within all organizational contexts.131 Ultimately,
they highlight the absence of the kind of mechanism that is required to have the
desired effect: giving the DOL monitoring ability at the pre-enforcement stage.
Only by moving in the direction of an ex ante constraint (as opposed to the 1998
MOU, which is ex post in nature) that can be enforced by an external source (as
opposed to the operating instruction, which provides internal guidance) can any
interagency arrangement hope to influence ICE. The figure below further
illustrates this concept.
Figure 1

DOL
Pursue
labor
remedies
1998 MOU

Employer

Tip/lead
O.I. 287.3a

ICE

Target
workplace

Detain and
Remove
Workers

To appreciate the shortcomings of these constraints, consider the
following example: In 2005, 48 immigrant workers in Goldsboro, North Carolina
came across several posted fliers promoting what was billed as a mandatory health
and safety training session by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
Upon arrival at the meeting, the workers were promptly detained for removal by
several DHS officials who had represented themselves as OSHA officials to lure
these workers out of the shadows.132 The DOL insisted that it was not involved in
planning this sting operation and set out immediately to clarify to surrounding
immigrant communities that DHS had conducted the investigation all on its
131.
Indeed, these administrative fixes have been seized upon by immigrant rights
activists concerned with deterring ICE from making workplace enforcement decisions that
ignore the labor consequences. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., ISSUE BRIEF:
IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
DURING
LABOR
DISPUTES
(2009),
available
at http://www.nilc.org/dc_conf/flashdrive09/Worker-Rights/emp20_labordispute-infobrief2009-11-06.pdf.
132.
See Greenhouse, Immigration Sting, supra note 11; Greenhouse, Officials
Defend Ploys, supra note 11.
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own.133 The operating instruction proved to be no deterrent in this case because it
impinges on ICE’s ability to make enforcement decisions only where a labor
dispute is in progress,134 which was not the case here. Moreover, although ICE was
not co-opted into suppressing labor rights in that particular case, its actions
certainly undermined the DOL and the state labor agency’s long-term efforts to
promote and facilitate the reporting of labor violations by unauthorized migrants in
North Carolina. The Goldsboro example also highlights the gaps and shortcomings
of the 1998 MOU. Immigration officials were required to share information
regarding labor violations discovered in the course of worksite investigations. The
MOU did not require these officials to consider whether their enforcement
decisions would generate negative labor consequences. In other words, to the
extent ICE considered whether their actions would displace labor law, the MOU
forced them to do so only after the fact. This arrangement did not force
immigration officials at the ex ante stage to consider the externalities they would
impose onto the DOL, the NLRB, or other labor enforcement agencies, thus
demonstrating a limited ability to encourage ICE to think beyond its narrow
mission orientation. Permitting workers in removal proceedings to pursue labor
remedies ultimately imposes costs on employers and not ICE. And whatever gains
that were realized in punishing an individual employer had to be weighed (to the
extent they were at all) against the setbacks the DOL experienced by having to
quash any misinformation within immigration communities about its relationship
to ICE and about whether reporting a labor violation will actually lead to the
removal of that worker.
C. Implications for Redesigning Workplace Monitoring
The ineffectiveness of current monitoring arrangements suggests that
reform-minded individuals could benefit from thinking carefully about increasing
the DOL’s ability to affect enforcement decisions ex ante—that is, before ICE
begins moving from the target stage to the enforcement stage. Doing so will reduce
the likelihood that ICE officials will simply resolve ambiguities in favor of swift
enforcement and create a more effective means for forcing officials to stop and
think. I have included a graphical depiction below to further illustrate this point.

133.
One union official noted: “The word being brought back to worksites after a
scam like this is that OSHA can’t be trusted. That kind of perception diminishes OSHA’s
ability to do the critical work of protecting America’s labor force.” Greenhouse,
Immigration Sting, supra note 11.
134.
The ICE officer must also feel compelled to pursue this line of questioning
on the snitch. In any event, a clever employer is going to be able to circumvent this
operating instruction by not volunteering any information about the labor dispute.
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Figure 2
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Conceptualizing labor agencies as monitors can help refine existing
arguments in favor of expanding the role of labor and employment agencies within
the immigration universe. For example, Leticia Saucedo has argued in favor of
expanding the ability of agencies like DOL and the EEOC to utilize the U visa as a
means for collective resistance by workers against employers.135 She and others
have argued that increasing the degree of coordination between immigration
enforcement and labor enforcement agencies is crucial to enabling unauthorized
workers to assert their work-related rights.136 The monitoring framework
acknowledges, first, that any partnership entered into by these agencies in the
context of workplace enforcement will almost certainly involve disagreement,
negotiation, and perhaps even resentment between the bureaucrats populating these
agencies, and second, that these tensions nevertheless can be productive if
structured properly.137
How should this relationship be structured? Historically, interagency
arrangements have been either easily circumvented by bad-actor employers (e.g.,
135.
See Saucedo, supra note 18, at 944–51.
136.
See id. at 941 (arguing that such partnerships “can eradicate exploitative
employment practices without exposing workers to deportation threats”); see also Rathod,
supra note 4, at 555–56 (arguing in favor of a MOU between OSHA and DHS requiring
DHS to refrain from conducting a worksite raid while the target worksite is being
investigated by OSHA).
137.
One DOL official described the process of engaging DHS as “slowly
breaking down a building, brick by brick.” Interview with DOL Official (June 23, 2011)
(conducted on condition of anonymity). This official continued:
DHS is married to its police power, as is DOL, but our mandate is
different. Just as DHS is so gung ho about its mission, DOL is gung ho
about ours. Our investigators can’t do their job if workers fear that
investigators are somehow undercover ICE agents. It impedes the
enforcement of our labor laws. . . . [Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis] has
been adamant about displacing workers’ fears, and this MOU is a tool in
that fight.
Id.
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O.I. 287.3a) or incomplete in their reach (e.g., the 1998 MOU) and thus failed to
compel ICE to take seriously what are (from its perspective) secondary labor
goals. Therefore, monitoring offers a way for agencies like the DOL to influence
the process by which ICE moves from receiving information to actually targeting
and investigating that worksite. It must be able to force immigration officials to
stop and think.
Although the precise contours of worksite reformation are beyond the
scope of this Article, it is worth elaborating on how monitoring adjustments could
place greater pressure on ICE officials to take the labor consequences of their
decisions seriously. One robust form of monitoring would require ICE to obtain
permission from the DOL before investigating a particular workplace. If, for
example, ICE received a tip that a particular employer had hired unauthorized
workers, before proceeding to investigate the workplace, ICE officials would have
to confer with the DOL and other labor agencies to determine whether a laborrelated complaint had been filed against the employer.138 In other words, the DOL
would have to affirmatively consent to the investigation before ICE could proceed.
Such an arrangement would also serve to constrain the overzealous decisions of
officials blinded by their mission orientation. Drawing inspiration from the Fourth
Amendment example, this type of ex ante check would act as a constraint on the
exercise of executive power.139 In a twist on the rationale that police officers are
likely to see probable cause where none exists, history has shown that ICE officials
are likely to ignore signs of labor exploitation where plenty exist.
Another, perhaps more politically feasible alternative would be to require
ICE officials to conduct a pre-investigation check to determine whether a
particular worksite is subject to a labor dispute. Given that a bad-actor employer
would not likely offer up information about an ongoing labor dispute (thus evading
the reach of Operating Instruction 287.3a), the labor complaint database provides
an important data point for ICE to consider before making an enforcement
decision. Such a monitoring scheme would require the creation of a database that
could be updated by the various federal labor agencies, who are in a position to
collect such information.140 Regardless of the precise contours of such an
arrangement, collecting and making available such information can make
meaningful the protections promised (but not delivered) by O.I. 287.3a.
The benefits of interagency monitoring extend beyond the narrow context
of any individual enforcement decision. Rather, over the long-term, structured
138.
See Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: The Border Crossed Us: Current
Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389, 390–93 (2004)
(identifying the strong correlation between worksite raids and the presence of formal labor
complaints having been filed against those worksites).
139.
See Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the
Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1410 (2010).
140.
Scholars have advocated for the development of a similar sort of information
database in other contexts. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to
Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J.
1, 65 (2009) (arguing that a “publicly accessible clearinghouse for information sharing” can
help reduce the uncertainty that impedes effective climate change regulation).
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interactions between agencies can productively inform the formation of strategy
and policy as these agencies discuss enforcement goals and compliance
definitions. Several years after IRCA was passed, different agencies began
assessing whether and to what extent employers were complying with the
prohibition against hiring unauthorized workers. The INS and the DOL each
conducted their own studies, with the INS finding a 70–80% compliance rate and
the DOL determining a 40% compliance rate.141 The DOL deemed an employer to
be noncompliant if, after a workplace investigation, it sent a notice to the INS of
the possible presence of an immigration-related violation. Although these two
agencies could not agree on the meaning of employer compliance, this
disagreement created the opportunity for what has been referred to in another
context as a reason-producing conversation;142 it forced each agency to reconsider
and refine its approach to a common goal.
Reforms in the mold of ex ante monitoring offer a complement to the
U visa model of reform, the benefits of which attach at the ex post stage.143 For
example, the President has activated the DOL’s ability to certify U visas.144 While
this laudable step provides much-needed relief to exploited workers, the relief is
ultimately limited in scope. For one thing, with eight million unauthorized
migrants in the workforce and an annual U visa limit of 10,000,145 it is almost
certainly the case that many unauthorized workers who have experienced labor
violations will not gain the benefit of a U visa. Moreover, the language of the
statute does not expressly recognize the unique set of harms unauthorized migrants
experience on account of their vulnerable status in the workplace. Rather,
unauthorized workers have been able to attain relief through the application of
more generalizable harms, which are applied to their specific circumstances.146
141.
See Martin & Miller, supra note 88, at 31–32. According to Martin and
Miller’s study, the U.S. General Accounting Office also conducted its own study and found
a 50% compliance rate. See id. at 32 (noting that the GAO surveyed 6000 of the nation’s six
million non-farm employers and found that only 50% were in compliance).
142.
In developing his theory of covering, Kenji Yoshino argues that coerced
assimilation should be rejected where there is no supporting reason or where there is a
reason that has been deemed illegitimate. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN
ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 26–27 (2006).
143.
See Saucedo, supra note 18, at 913–14, 942–43. The ex ante/ex post
distinction is not a firm one as it is applied to the case of U visas. It is, of course, entirely
possible for the DOL to screen detained workers for U visa eligibility at the back end as a
part of a larger enforcement strategy that would coordinate with DHS at the front end. It
remains to be seen whether the 2011 MOU binding DHS and the DOL will lead to greater
ex ante coordination in this respect. But whether the ex ante coordination is given
expression through the U visa framework, or through some other monitoring framework, the
larger point this Article seeks to develop is that DHS’s enforcement discretion in the
workplace should be constrained in some capacity in the first instance.
144.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department to Exercise
Authority to Certify Applications for U visas (Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter DOL to Exercise
Authority], available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/OPA20100312.htm.
145.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A) (2006).
146.
A noncitizen is eligible for a U visa where she possesses “information
concerning criminal activity.” Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(II). The statute defines “criminal
activity” as
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While such a solution is workable, such relief rests largely within the scope of the
enforcement discretion of immigration officials—which is precisely what the
interagency monitoring framework attempts to constrain.147 Therefore, unless and
until Congress amends the scope of the statutory language, the ability of
unauthorized workers to obtain U visa relief will continue to be circumscribed by
the generosity of executive discretion.148 In this sense, monitoring and temporary
visas apply pressure on enforcement decisions from either side in the hopes of
deterring overreaching. But in another sense, ex ante monitoring can cure one set
of pathologies that ex post visas cannot: It can help minimize the externalities that
ICE actions can impose on other agencies downstream. 149 A part of the problem
with the current arrangement is that the DOL exerts little influence over ICE
enforcement decisions and—as was evident from the Goldsboro worksite raid—it
is forced to internalize the costs of overzealous worksite raid decisions. So long as
ICE remains the lead agency in the context of workplace enforcement and operates
free from constraint, it will almost certainly continue to exercise its enforcement
discretion in a manner that best serves its interests at the expense of those of the
DOL.150 Because the immigration bureaucracy is comprised of multiple agencies,
involving one or more of the following or any similar activity in
violation of Federal, state, or local criminal law: rape; torture;
trafficking; incest; domestic violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual
contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; female genital mutilation;
being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade;
kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment;
blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness
tampering; obstruction of justice; perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, or
solicitation to commit any of the above mentioned crimes.
Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii).
147.
ICE does not possess a monopoly over the visa certification process. Under
federal regulations, the DOL and the EEOC are also empowered to certify a worker’s
eligibility for U visa relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2011) (“Certifying agency means a
Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, prosecutor, judge, or other authority, that
has responsibility for the investigation or prosecution of a qualifying crime or criminal
activity. This definition includes . . . the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
the Department of Labor.”).
148.
See Saucedo, supra note 4, at 319 (advocating for a statutory amendment that
would expressly include extortion, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and perjury as
qualifying crimes under the TVPA).
149.
For example, one “downstream” consequence of the increase in DHS
enforcement activity is a concomitant increase in cases that must be adjudicated before
immigration judges, who are overseen by the Department of Justice. See MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 31).
150.
Other areas of administrative law reflect the importance of the initial
enforcement decision, particularly where an agency faces a series of decisions related to the
same regulatory matter. In the related context of environmental regulation, Alejandro
Camacho points out that
[i]n most instances, virtually all agency attention and resources are
directed at the initial decision, regardless of how little information there
is to make the decision. Once an initial decision is made, whether
regarding an individual project or an entire program, the agency rarely
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tension and disharmony will persist as constitutive features of the administration of
U.S. immigration laws. Framed this way, interagency monitoring offers one way to
harness the tension and diversity of viewpoints into something productive.151
Therefore, my argument is that interagency tension can be productive provided
that we can find an arrangement where labor agencies can exert greater influence
over ICE’s workplace enforcement decisions. Put differently, monitoring requires
embracing interagency tension while simultaneously reallocating power.
Over the long term, structured experimentation can benefit policymakers
by providing them with an empirical record on which they can make more
informed choices.152 Where two agencies vie for favorable public perception, this
sort of arrangement can increase an agency’s willingness to expose its otherwise
shadowy, internal decisionmaking process. For example, during the final years of
the Bush administration, reports emerged of widespread abuses of unauthorized
migrant rights, ranging from unsafe workplace conditions to mass deportation
hearings.153 During such a moment, the public and Congress are primed to reward
those officials and entities who have worked in the service of affirming rights.
During that moment, had our administrative state been structured so that the DOL
played a more prominent role in the regulation of unauthorized workers, one can
imagine the DOL seizing that opportunity to distance itself from DHS, seeking out
more resources to carry out its own mandate, and allying itself with those elected
officials who felt pressure to respond to the abuses. In a study of interagency
coordination among state agencies, Eugene Bardach observes:
Almost nothing about the bureaucratic ethos makes it
hospitable to interagency collaboration. . . . Making the transition
revisits it in any systematic way to adjust the decision or learn from its
successes or limitations for future actions.
Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1414 (2011) (citations omitted).
151.
Alejandro Camacho’s work is again instructive. He argues that the
“exceptional uncertainty” posed by climate change is forcing scholars and governmental
officials to rethink how and why climate change-related information ought to be shared.
Camacho, supra note 140, at 7. Specifically, he advocates for the adoption of a “learning
infrastructure” where “legislators [establish] and promote use of a shared information
infrastructure that provides regulators opportunities to learn from the knowledge and
experience of other regulators and respond to rapid changes in natural systems, scientific
knowledge, and technology.” Id.
152.
In the context of the dual enforcement of antitrust laws, William Kovacic
observes:
One way to test the merits of different implementation options is to
conduct a natural experiment with more than one technique.
Experimentation generates an empirical basis for determining what the
long-term enforcement should be. Actual experience provides insights
for adjusting the mix of enforcement institutions by revealing which
techniques are successful and which are not.
William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual Federal Enforcement?,
41 ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 518 (1996).
153.
See SMITH ET AL., supra note 13, at 15–29 (summarizing various instances
where ICE during the years 2005 to 2008 engaged in enforcement activity that undermined
labor rights).
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from an existing way of doing agency business to a new and more
collaborative way requires actors to withdraw at least temporarily
from the bureaucratic ethos. They must spurn something they may
have at least respected if not cherished. 154

Recently, DHS and the DOL produced a new MOU superseding prior
coordination policies.155 Certain features of this MOU reflect an Executive desire
to coordinate workplace enforcement decisions at the front end of the investigation
process. One provision in particular seems promising as a mechanism for
interagency monitoring: The MOU prohibits ICE “from engaging in civil worksite
enforcement activities at a worksite that is the subject of an existing DOL
investigation of a labor dispute during the pendency of the DOL investigation and
any related proceeding.”156 This provision suggests that DHS’s enforcement
agenda must yield to labor goals in workplaces where the DOL has already
asserted jurisdiction. Such an arrangement mirrors many of the kinds of
interagency monitoring schemes that have developed in other areas of law. By
recasting the DOL’s jurisdiction as impregnable, the MOU forces DHS to
accommodate labor law’s interest in protecting unauthorized workers as workers,
before allowing DHS to pursue immigration law’s interest in them as
unauthorized, and hence potentially removable, migrants. In this respect, the MOU
attempts to cure the asymmetric enforcement authority that has troubled workplace
enforcement policy for years. The MOU is written in a way that divests DHS of its
ability to displace the enforcement of labor goals, at least where the DOL gets
there first.157
Importantly, the MOU leaves open the possibility that the displacement
will run in the other direction in all other circumstances. In worksites where
employers are using the unauthorized status of their workers to suppress labor
dissent and the DOL has not initiated an investigation (or where a labor
investigation has been initiated but by a corresponding state agency), DHS largely
remains free to harmonize immigration and labor goals as it sees fit. While other
provisions in the MOU encourage, or perhaps even require, DHS to consult with
the DOL before conducting a worksite investigation, these arrangements give the
DOL what might generously be described as hortatory monitoring power. For
example, the MOU requires ICE to give the DOL notice of pending workplace
enforcement activity, unless doing so would violate federal law or otherwise
compromise the investigation.158 For its part, the DOL agrees to facilitate this
process by providing ICE with information regarding its own enforcement
activities to avoid the sort of confusion and conflict that can displace the DOL’s
154.
See BARDACH, supra note 107, at 232.
155.
Revised Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. and U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/
reports/hispaniclaborforce/dhs-dol-mou.pdf.
156.
Id. at 2.
157.
The MOU also specifically prohibits ICE from engaging in the kinds of
impersonation tactics used in the Goldsboro, North Carolina investigation. See id. at 3
(“Under no circumstances will ICE personnel engaged in enforcement activities at a
worksite suggest that they represent or act for DOL absent the express approval of DOL.”).
158.
See id.
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labor enforcement goals.159 Therefore, while this recent attempt to harmonize these
competing goals recognizes discrete moments where DHS can be estopped from
displacing labor enforcement goals, it remains to be seen whether such an
intervention is enough to force DHS officials to absorb these labor-centric norms.
D. The Limitations of Labor Agencies
A question embedded within the interagency monitoring framework is
whether an agency like the DOL can be trusted to protect the interests of
unauthorized workers. Although the DOL’s primary mission is to protect workers
against work-related exploitation, historically, the DOL has privileged the interests
of citizen workers over noncitizen workers. This suggests that DOL officials might
be tempted to shirk their monitoring duties to the extent that a particular workplace
inspection implicates unauthorized workers and only unauthorized workers.
Despite the status-neutral nature of U.S. labor laws, the immigration enforcement
origins of the DOL do give some traction to the concern that it maintains a citizencentric orientation.160 At least three reasons help assure that such a distortion, to
the extent it exists, will not be overly pronounced.
First, it is not entirely clear that the DOL and other labor agencies will
necessarily privilege the interests of citizens over noncitizens, even given the
resource constraints that those agencies face. Although the descriptive picture is
still developing, at least some of the social science literature suggests that labor
agency bureaucrats have folded unauthorized migrants into their mandate,
embraced the status-neutral nature of labor protections, and given little to no
weight to the perceived moral unworthiness of these migrant workers. As Shannon
Gleeson has demonstrated, labor agency officials have gone to great lengths to not
ask any question that might elicit disqualifying information about a worker’s

159.
See id.
160.
Immigration enforcement’s labor origins maintain an evocative quality. In
recent testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, a former ICE officer concluded his
largely anti-Obama testimony with a reference to the DOL’s immigration past. Retired
special agent Michael Cutler provided the following testimony:
A final point. Prior to the Second World War, the Department of Labor
was responsible for enforcing our immigration laws. The concern was
that an influx of foreign workers would drive down wages and worsen
the working conditions of the American worker. . . . Effective worksite
enforcement can protect our nation and our workers and turn off the
power to the magnet that draws so many illegal aliens to our country.
ICE Worksite Enforcement—Up to the Job?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 97 (2011)
(statement of Michael W. Cutler, Senior Special Agent (Ret.), Immigration and
Naturalization Service) (emphasis added).
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immigration status.161 These interactions are filled with what King-Kok Cheung
might refer to as “articulate silences.”162
Second, organized labor’s position on immigration policy has shifted over
the last several decades, and certainly since the DOL last wielded primary
immigration enforcement authority. Therefore, to the extent that DOL officials are
inclined to respond more favorably to citizen workers, the interests of many
citizens are tied to their unauthorized counterparts. Given the declining number of
unionized workplaces, labor organizations have increasingly (if begrudgingly)
embraced unauthorized workers as allies and not competitors.163 Of course, the
organized labor community is heterogeneous and the debate over where
unauthorized workers belong within this community (if at all) is far from settled.164
But even this initial shift enables the DOL to pursue labor enforcement strategies
on the assumption that in at least some contexts, the benefits of expanding the
rights of unauthorized workers will redound to workers more broadly.
A third reason the DOL will be unlikely to shirk on immigration-related
workplace enforcement duties is the budget increase that would likely follow any
such expansion of authority. As others have pointed out, Congress has increasingly
devoted funds toward interior enforcement strategies.165 Indeed, one program
within the U.S. workplace enforcement scheme that has actually received an
increase in funding is the U visa.166 Given that this represents one area of the labor
and criminal law intersection that finds some degree of synergy, it is not surprising
that the DOL recently began exercising its authority to certify U visas.167

161.
See Shannon Gleeson, “To Protect One, We Must Protect All”: Bureaucratic
Scripts for Protecting Undocumented Workers 14–15 (Feb. 18, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript, presented at Immigration Law Symposium, University of California, Irvine,
School of Law) (on file with author).
162.
See KING-KOK CHEUNG, ARTICULATE SILENCES: HISAYE YAMAMOTO,
MAXINE HONG KINGSTON, JOY KOGAWA (1993).
163.
See Statement of the Executive Council on Immigration, AFL–CIO (Feb. 16,
2000), http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec0216200b.cfm (calling for
legal reforms that extend full labor protections to undocumented workers); see also
Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons from Three
Rounds of Negotiations, 40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 543 (2002); Catherine Fisk & Michael
Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without
Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399 (Laura Cooper &
Catherine Fisk eds., 2005).
164.
See Marc Santora, Immigration: From Talking Point to Sore Point, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at A1 (noting that labor unions remain resistant to liberal immigration
policies).
165.
For example, ICE and CBP have a combined operating budget of $15 billion.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 19 (2007),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf. By comparison, the
INS’s budget in 1998 was $3.6 billion. See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1563, 1571–73 (2010) (discussing rising trend of immigration enforcement).
166.
See Teresa Watanabe, U.S. Officials Boost Efforts to Protect Immigrant
Crime Victims, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, at A1.
167.
See DOL to Exercise Authority, supra note 144.
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To be clear, empowering the DOL does not represent a silver bullet. As
with any change at the level of culture and group identity, reform-minded
individuals must take the long view. And because it is both infeasible and
impracticable to give the DOL immigration enforcement authority, we are left with
ICE, enforcement discretion, and an assortment of questions as to how best to
deter the exercise of discretion that perpetuates workplace exploitation. But giving
the DOL the power to monitor and constrain the exercise of that discretion is an
important start. It invites us to think more carefully about how peer agencies, and
not just principals, can police the overreaching of ICE officials.

IV. EVOLVING MONITORING CHALLENGES
Within the interagency monitoring framework, changing the culture of the
lead agency largely depends on sharing information and empowering other
agencies to shape decisions that are being made on the basis of that information.
Empowering federal labor agencies to monitor the types of information ICE
receives has the potential to guide ICE workplace enforcement actions in a manner
more consistent with IRCA. But this monitoring framework also points the way to
other areas where labor law faces the threat of displacement on account of
immigration enforcement tactics.
Local law enforcement entities have played an increasingly large role in
regulating immigrants, and in the process, have begun to undermine the assertion
of workplace-related rights. One of the key challenges thus far has been forcing
ICE to become more discriminating in the tips and leads it relies on when targeting
a workplace. Up until now, the primary concern has been ensuring that ICE does
not unreflectively act on an employer tip given the strong incentives employers
have to report unauthorized workers at the first sign of labor-oriented activity. But
local immigration enforcement creates more potential sources of information on
which ICE can rely when targeting a workplace. As local immigration enforcement
becomes more prevalent, crafty employers can report incompliant workers to local
law enforcement officers who are not covered by reporting restrictions. A recent
dispute case in Tennessee exemplifies this dynamic.
Durrett Cheese Sales hired a number of unauthorized workers from
Mexico to perform a variety of jobs within its factory, including slicing,
packaging, and processing cheese for sale.168 These workers performed several
weeks’ worth of work for which they were not paid.169 After several weeks without
pay, these workers organized themselves to protest their nonpayment, at which
point the supervisors fired the workers, ordered them off company property, and
promptly contacted the local sheriff’s department. When the officers arrived, the
supervisors informed them that the workers were undocumented (and that they
should therefore be reported to ICE) and provided them with the relevant

168.
Montano-Perez v. Durrett Cheese Sales, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d 894, 897
(M.D. Tenn. 2009).
169.
Id. The workers also experienced other harms. For example, their supervisor
made “offensive and potentially humiliating comments . . . about their race, national origin,
intelligence, language, and customs, among other things.” Id.
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paperwork to facilitate this process.170 The workers were detained, and although no
state charges were filed against them, a captain in the sheriff’s department reported
these workers to ICE.171
The Durrett case highlights the evolving difficulties of policing the
information that ICE relies on in carrying out its immigration duties. Until now,
regulatory fixes have focused on constraining the behavior of ICE officials or
employers and have not had the opportunity to squarely confront a third-party state
entity that simply “impose[s] the will” of the bad-actor employer.172 At the
moment of confrontation, had the Durrett supervisor reported the workers to
ICE—and had the receiving officer suspected that Durrett was in the midst of a
labor dispute—in theory, ICE would have had to withhold or delay action under
existing operating instructions.173 But because ICE was notified of these workers
by way of local law enforcement officers, employers are able to circumvent any
restrictions developed between ICE and the DOL. Given the growing number of
local jurisdictions embracing an anti-immigrant posture, a low-level ICE official
would have little or no reason to suspect that the information she is receiving is
tainted or that acting on the tip enables an employer to escape liability for labor
violations. The challenge moving forward, therefore, involves designing
monitoring arrangements that help ensure that both ICE and local entities
internalize labor enforcement norms.174
It is worth highlighting that the Durrett example involved local law
enforcement officers carrying out immigration-related duties that were completely
independent of any federal source. Although immigration enforcement authority is
typically understood to fall within the federal government’s plenary power—and
thus preemptive of state efforts to encroach on such power—local police face no
comparable constraints when obtaining immigration-related information while
carrying out routine policing duties.175 In these situations, given that local law
170.
Id. at 898; see also Complaint, Durrett Cheese Sales, 666 F. Supp. 2d
894 (No. 3:08-1015), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/
Durrett_Complaint.pdf.
171.
Durrett Cheese Sales, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
172.
Id. at 902 (“[T]hroughout the entire process, the County Defendants simply
imposed the will of the Durrett Defendants, which was to permanently remove the plaintiffs
from the premises (and, perhaps, the country) because the plaintiffs had complained about
pay.”).
173.
See O.I. 287.3a, supra note 125.
174.
It is worth noting that a second and related monitoring challenge grows out
of the increase in federal prosecutions of immigration crimes. In the Durrett Cheese Sales
case, although the suit between the workers and the employer and sheriff defendants settled,
the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Tennessee charged those same immigrants for
using false social security numbers to obtain employment. See Mercer, supra note 10.
175.
See Cristina M. Rodríguez et al., Legal Limits on Immigration Federalism, in
TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 31, 46
(Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010) (explaining that while “these ancillary enforcement
measures will compromise trust between the police and immigrant communities, these laws
are not susceptible to legal challenge on their face and are reflective of standard practice”).
In 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel of Department of Justice issued a controversial
opinion explaining that state and local entities had the “inherent” authority to arrest
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enforcement officers, like those in the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department, will be
acting independently of federal authority, federal agencies will have no legal basis
on which they can prevent these enforcement officers from acting on the
immigration-related information they gather.
One specific context in which this may play out is in 287(g) agreements.
In 1996, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to permit federal
immigration officials to enter into an agreement with state or local law
enforcement officers, which effectively deputizes them to carry out immigration
enforcement duties.176 In 2002, the Executive began entering into Memoranda of
Agreement (“MOA”) with local jurisdictions interested in carrying out
immigration duties. By 2009, DHS had 66 active agreements with state and local
law enforcement agencies in 23 states and 833 active 287(g) officers.177 This
program, along with other local immigration enforcement strategies,178 is a part of
individuals for immigration violations. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Attorney Gen.,
Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest
Aliens for Immigration Violations 13 (Apr. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf. See also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32270,
ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 6–8
(2009), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf (summarizing the
2002 memo and explaining how it departed from prior OLC opinions).
176.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The
relevant provision is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). Although § 1357(g) specifically
names the Attorney General, this along with other immigration enforcement duties were
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security under the Homeland Security Act. See
6 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
177.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-10-63, THE
PERFORMANCE OF 287(g) AGREEMENTS 2 (2010) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE OF
287(g) AGREEMENTS], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_1063_Mar10.pdf.
178.
Two are worth highlighting. The Secure Communities program allows
partnering jurisdictions to access a biometric database that includes information about the
immigration status of the people local officers detain. Under the program, local law
enforcement agencies submit the fingerprints of the arrestee, and if they match those of
someone in the database with a criminal record, the arresting officers will be notified. See
Secure Communities: A Fact Sheet, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/secure-communities-fact-sheet. The Secure
Communities program has emerged as a central part of the Obama administration’s strategy
for targeting noncitizens who have been convicted of a removable crime. According to a
recent study, 83% of people arrested through this program are placed in detention as
opposed to only 62% of individuals arrested through other channels. AARTI KOHLI ET AL.,
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE
NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 2 (2011), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. DHS aims
to cover 100% of jurisdictions by 2013. See Secure Communities Deployment as of January
7, 2010, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-dep.pdf. The
other enforcement strategy is the Criminal Alien Program where local jail officials hold
arrestees until ICE can screen them. Fact Sheet: Criminal Alien Program, U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/
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a larger interior enforcement strategy that has been embraced by both President
Bush and President Obama: ramping up efforts to target criminal noncitizens
through partnerships with local law enforcement agencies.
In theory, 287(g) agreements present an opportunity to mitigate the
Durrett problem. If the problem is that bad-actor employers are able to circumvent
informational constraints by providing tips and leads through local police, then the
contract-driven nature of 287(g) agreements provides a potential fix: DHS could
simply write into the MOA terms the requirement that local agencies refrain from
exercising its federally conferred immigration authority if doing so would
perpetuate labor violations. These entities would have to promise not to use their
immigration authority to subvert labor protections as a condition of receiving that
authority. But the 287(g) program has reflected significant implementation
problems. A core challenge has been to ensure that local officers exercise their
delegated authority in a manner that actually furthers the program’s purpose.179 As
is the case with many of these partnerships, acting under federally conferred
immigration authority enables local law enforcement officers to do more. They can
undertake actions that would otherwise by prohibited if they were acting under
their traditional state criminal law enforcement authority.180 Although reform
efforts may be underway,181 the reality is that DHS already faces considerable
library/factsheets/cap.htm. See also Chacón, supra note 165, at 1582–98 (summarizing
other federally initiated local immigration enforcement programs).
179.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 15 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf (noting that one problem has been the lack of
instructions as to how 287(g) authority should be exercised by state and local entities); see
also PERFORMANCE OF 287(g) AGREEMENTS, supra note 177, at 8–9 (noting that although the
purpose of 287(g) partnerships is to identify and remove “criminal aliens who pose a threat
to public safety or a danger to the community” the OIG’s findings “do not show that 287(g)
resources have been focused on aliens who pose the greatest risk to the public”). Recently,
Congress conditioned the appropriation of funds on DHS terminating 287(g) agreements
with any jurisdictions found to be in violation of the terms of the delegation. See
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, tit. II,
123 Stat. 2142, 2148–49 (2009) (“For necessary expenses for enforcement of immigration
and customs laws, detention and removals, and investigations; . . . Provided further, That
none of the funds provided under this heading may be used to continue a delegation of law
enforcement authority authorized under section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)) if the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General
determines that the terms of the agreement governing the delegation of authority have been
violated[.]”). For a discussion of principal–agent problems in the context of public
administration, see Avinash Dixit, Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An
Interpretive Review, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 696 (2002).
180.
See Eagly, supra note 66, at 1339 (“Police need not rely on the criminal law
if they can arrest, detain, and search with their immigration powers. Furthermore, because
the police can access law enforcement with fewer procedural restraints on the immigration
side without invoking their criminal powers, they may be incentivized to proceed as
immigration enforcers rather than criminal enforcers.”).
181.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Secretary Napolitano Announces New
Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New
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challenges in ensuring that local law enforcement officers comport with federal
priorities.182

CONCLUSION
Several agencies must grapple with the phenomenon of unauthorized
migration, and as a result, these agencies often stand at cross-purposes. In this
Article, I have endeavored to show that, although these tensions have generated
some pathologies in the context of workplace enforcement, they need not always
be counterproductive. Specifically, I have argued that empowering the Department
of Labor and other labor agencies to monitor immigration enforcement decisions at
the ex ante stage can help reduce externalities that impact such agencies. Doing so
can also draw into sharper relief emerging vulnerabilities as labor law,
immigration law, and criminal law continue to find common ground. There is still
much to be learned, but in the meantime, this Article urges reform-minded
individuals interested in improving workplace enforcement to consider ex ante
monitoring options as one way to disrupt and prod the current system-wide stasis.

Agreements (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/
pr_1247246453625.shtm.
182.
This dynamic has been reproduced within other local enforcement programs
as well. One study found that the most noticeable consequence of a local jurisdiction’s
participation in the Criminal Alien Program partnership was the increase of class-C
misdemeanor arrests of Latinos. This class of misdemeanor—typically public intoxication
or a minor traffic violation—exacts a punishment in the form of a fine not to exceed $500,
which when combined with the spike in arrests of Latinos strongly suggests race-based
policing rather than the prioritization of those criminal noncitizens threatening public safety.
See TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE,
ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL
ALIEN PROGRAM 5 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_
irving_FINAL.pdf.
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